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ABSTRACT 
TIMOTHY KING: Pharmaceutical Research and Development: A Key Informant 
Assessment of Whether an “Open-Science” Model Could Improve Clinical Research 
in Terms of Quality and Efficiency  
(Under the direction of John E. Paul) 
The average cost to develop each new pharmaceutical drug is approximately 
$1 billion or more and takes 12-15 years from laboratory concept to an approved 
drug on the shelf at the local pharmacy. There is concern that the high cost and 
extended timelines required for pharmaceutical research and development (R&D) is 
not sustainable in the long term, as pharmaceutical companies question the value of 
investing $1 billion against an uncertain future revenue stream. The high cost of 
R&D contributes to the high cost of pharmacotherapies to consumers, where one 
recent estimate projects that annual global spending on pharmaceuticals will exceed 
$1.2 trillion by 2016. 
Spending over $1 trillion on pharmaceuticals each year is a burden on global 
health resources. Therefore, reducing the cost of pharmaceuticals could have a 
tremendous impact on patients’ access to healthcare. A potential source of cost 
reduction is to improve efficiency in pharmaceutical R&D while protecting patient 
safety and maintaining or improving research quality. If savings in pharmaceutical 
R&D could be passed on to consumers, this would result in lower pharmaceutical 
prices and healthcare costs worldwide.  
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One concept proposed to improve R&D efficiency and quality is to make the 
process more transparent and collaborative where researchers, even those from 
competing pharmaceutical companies, could more freely share information on their 
research designs, processes and outcomes. This concept, “open-science” R&D 
(OSRD), differs from traditional R&D approaches that typically are more secretive 
and less collaborative.  
To explore whether OSRD could be a viable and beneficial alternative to 
current pharmaceutical R&D practices, key informants from academia, industry, and 
regulatory agencies were interviewed using a qualitative, semi-structured 
questionnaire. While the key informants were concerned that for-profit 
pharmaceutical companies would not voluntarily embrace OSRD, the results also 
revealed that, 1) OSRD may be more efficient and therefore better in terms of R&D 
costs, 2) many OSRD-type activities are already in place, 3) more transparency is 
probably inevitable, and 4) senior leaders, including those in industry, are open to 
exploring opportunities for broad transparency and collaboration such as those 
envisioned in OSRD. 
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PREFACE 
The last 60 years of innovations in clinical research have not made the 
enterprise more efficient – actually the opposite. Analysis shows that while the 
number of drugs approved annually fluctuates to some degree, overall approvals 
have remained static while the financial resources required for research and 
development (R&D) have soared at a rate well beyond inflation.1 
In 2008, I was a Group Director at Quintiles, a large contract research 
organization (CRO), which provides financial, research, and sales support to the 
pharmaceutical industry. Founder and then CEO Dennis Gillings stated in internal 
communications that the cost of pharma R&D was unsustainable and that Quintiles 
needed to find ways to “conduct three clinical trials for the cost of two” (personal 
communication). Put another way, the industry needed to reduce the cost of R&D by 
33%. He referred to Quintiles’ corporate goal to reduce pharma R&D costs as the “3 
for 2” initiative, and charged me and my colleagues to propose innovations to the 
current pharma R&D process to improve efficiency (reduce time and costs) while 
maintaining if not improving process quality. This corporate goal did not necessarily 
refer to improving quality in terms of the safety and efficacy of approved drugs, but 
to improve the quality of the R&D process.  
Many initiatives were proposed including Six-Sigma2 reviews of and 
modifications to Quintiles’ business processes and upgrades to computer software 
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and information systems. However, I viewed these innovations, although helpful, as 
incremental and unlikely to have a substantial impact on R&D process quality and 
efficiency. I theorized that the lack of transparency and collaboration in drug 
development may be doing more harm than good to the pharma business. While 
secrecy is intended to protect proprietary information and business interests, it may 
make the R&D process so inefficient that the net result could be an overall negative 
impact on profitability and sustainability, not only to the bottom line for Quintiles but 
to the entire drug development industry. I therefore proposed that Quintiles explore 
ways to promote transparency and collaboration among our pharma customers as a 
means to improve R&D, and I have come to refer to this approach as open-science 
R&D (OSRD).  
Moreover, to someone trained in population health, I felt that improving 
efficiency in pharma R&D could have a positive impact on global health by reducing 
the high cost of pharmacotherapies. Whether the inefficient processes in R&D can 
be significantly improved by OSRD is an issue much larger than the internal 
business processes of one CRO or pharma company, and therefore this research 
explores the viability of OSRD across the entire pharma industry. 
It is important to note that throughout this paper the focus is pharmaceuticals, 
but any beneficial innovations for R&D arguably would have similar benefits for other 
medical R&D efforts including medical devices and diagnostics. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Problem Statement 
The high cost of pharmaceuticals reduces patient access to needed therapies 
and places an enormous burden on healthcare worldwide, and therefore is a global 
population health issue.3 
Data suggest that per each new approved drug, pharmaceutical companies 
(pharma) must invest on average $1 billion or more over 12-15 years to proceed 
from laboratory concept to an approved drug on the shelf at the local pharmacy.4,5 
Another analysis of costs for each new drug approved from 1997 – 2012 among the 
ten largest pharma companies estimated the costs at approximately $4 – 12 billion.6 
Totaled across all drugs in development, the Pharmaceutical Research and 
Manufacturers of America (PhRMA), an industry-sponsored association, reports that 
2010 R&D investments approached $67 billion.7 There is consensus that this 
business model is not sustainable in the long term,1 as investors question the value 
of investing $1 billion or more per approved drug when measured against a highly 
uncertain return on investment (ROI).  
Pharmaceutical companies maintain that the high cost of R&D is a driver for 
the high cost to consumers of approved therapies. In Canada, for example, data 
from 2004 showed that the cost of pharmaceuticals exceeded the cost of physician 
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services.8 Recent reports estimate that the global expenditure for pharmaceuticals 
will exceed $1 trillion by 20149 and $1.2 trillion by 2016.10  
Therefore, in theory, significant reductions in pharma R&D investments would 
result in lower costs to pharma per approved drug. Pharma companies could then 
reduce the amount they charge consumers without eroding profit margins. In other 
words, if pharma needed to invest less for R&D, they could charge less per 
prescription to recover their R&D expenditures while maintaining current profit 
margins. Most importantly, if potential savings were passed on to consumers so that 
pharmacotherapies are less expensive, this could result in greater access to needed 
therapies for all people.  
Proposals to Reduce Pharmaceutical Costs 
As a result, many efforts are proposed or underway to decrease or at least 
reduce the rate of increase in pharmaceutical costs. Initiatives or market forces that 
may have a substantial impact on the costs of drugs include: 9 
 “Patent Cliff”: Many of the highest revenue generating pharmacotherapies 
are facing patent expiry by 2015, leading to increased production and 
demand for much less expensive generic drug options for over ten of the 
most profitable prescriptions.11 Note that generics tend to cost one-third of 
their brand name equivalents.12 
 Biosimilars: Recent rulings in the US and Europe are opening regulatory 
pathways to demonstrating that biosimilars are as safe and effective as 
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already approved biologic drugs, akin to generic drugs for small-molecule 
pharmaceuticals.13 
 Comparative Effectiveness Research (CER): Through CER data are 
analyzed to determine the most effective therapies for the cost. These data 
can then be used to guide patient, physician, and payer decision making. 
 Payer Reform: Both public (Medicare/Medicaid in the US) and private 
insurance payers are organizing and exerting more pressure on 
pharmacotherapy pricing in terms of which approved drugs payers are willing 
to purchase, for which patients, and at what price. 
 Improving Pharmaceutical R&D: The endeavor to make research better at 
determining the safety and effectiveness of potential therapies, while also 
more efficient and less expensive to conduct.  
On this last point, one possibility for improving pharma R&D in terms of 
quality and efficiency is creating more transparent and collaborative process. This 
concept is sometimes referred to as “Open-Science”, “Open-Source”, “Open 
Innovation”, or “Crowd-Sourcing”14,15 in drug discovery and development. For the 
remainder of this paper, the term open-science R&D (OSRD) is used to represent 
the broader concept of transparency and collaboration in pharma R&D which is the 
focus of this research. 
It is also important to note that throughout this paper pharmaceuticals, 
pharmacotherapies, and drugs are referenced, but any beneficial innovations for 
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R&D arguably would have similar benefits for other medical R&D efforts including 
medical devices and diagnostics. 
Current Drug Discovery and Development Process 
The first step assessing whether an OSRD approach could be beneficial in 
terms of R&D process quality and efficiency is to review the current drug discovery 
and development process. Most drugs are developed by private, for-profit 
pharmaceutical companies, although academic and/or government funded 
researchers also can have significant roles in the basic science and drug 
development process. Private in this case means not primarily supported by public 
(government) funding, but the companies may be either publically traded or privately 
held. These private businesses seek patents so that they own the drugs they are 
developing, and these patents can be on: 1) the molecular structure, 2) drug 
synthesis and manufacturing techniques, and, 3) “use” patents referring to the 
diseases or conditions the molecule is intended to treat. The patents are considered 
the intellectual property (IP) of each pharmaceutical company, which carefully 
protects its IP and works to keep it proprietary. In addition to protecting patented 
information, pharma companies tend to protect trade secrets – information that is not 
patentable but that pharma companies assume they should keep secret to protect 
their business interests. Examples of trade secrets include study protocols, data and 
results, and correspondence with regulatory agencies.   
This secretive dynamic applies to the drug discovery process, where potential 
compounds are synthesized and tested in a laboratory. The goal of drug discovery is 
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to create and identify unique molecules that have certain properties that should, in 
theory, have a beneficial medicinal effect, without having properties known or 
suspected to cause an adverse event (AE), or negative side effect. When such 
compounds are identified, the discoverer may then seek to obtain patents as 
described above. If patents are granted, then the patent holder may proceed to the 
drug development stage and seek regulatory approval to sell the drug.  
Drug development progresses through several stages (Figure 1), beginning 
with discovery and pre-clinical research that includes laboratory and animal testing 
for safety and also efficacy if possible. If the pre-clinical data are positive and 
compelling, a drug developer may then seek permission from a regulator such as the 
United States’ Food and Drug Administration (FDA) or the European Medicines 
Agency (EMA) to begin testing in human beings – the clinical development phase. 
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Figure 1. Drug discovery and development pathway  
 
PhRMA, 2007.16 
Traditional phases in clinical development include: 
 Phase I: Several studies to demonstrate “proof of concept”, begin 
establishing drug pharmacokinetics (PK) and pharmacodynamics (PD), and 
monitor for significant risk of adverse events that would preclude future 
research. Phase I research involves relatively few patients or healthy 
volunteers, often less than 20-30 per study, and usually includes no inferential 
statistical testing. 
 Phase II: Typically these are larger studies to establish minimally effective 
dose, maximum tolerated dose, and optimal dose or doses to carry forward 
into Phase III testing.  
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 Phase III: These are the largest studies to determine safety and efficacy with 
statistical significance. Phase III research often requires two large, well-
controlled, randomized trials (RCT) for market approval, can involve hundreds 
if not thousands of patients, and cost tens if not hundreds of millions of dollars 
to conduct. 
 Phase IV: Phase IV studies are also called post-marketing research and are 
conducted after the drug has been approved. Sometimes required by 
regulators after granting a contingent approval, Phase IV research often 
seeks to clarify the safety and efficacy of the approved drug in “real world” 
settings, meaning where patient selection and drug compliance is not tightly 
controlled as in the RCT(s) required in pre-approval research. 
Patents for pharmaceuticals typically are granted for 20 years,17 and 
assuming it requires on average 12-15 years and $1 billion to test the compound 
and receive regulatory approval, then a pharma company perhaps has only five 
years to recoup the bulk of the R&D investment, much less make a profit, some of 
which may then then spent on R&D for new drug candidates. 
Transparency and Collaboration in Drug Development 
Under the current business model, drug developers seek to keep as much 
information as possible about their drug candidate proprietary and protect their IP. 
Therefore, research methodologies and results, particularly any data that do not 
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support the business goal of gaining drug approval and support marketing, largely 
remain hidden from public scrutiny.  
The Collaborative Institutional Training Initiative (CITI) is an independent 
group created to train investigators on ethical conduct in clinical research. The CITI 
training is required for many scientists involved in research funded by either the 
Public Health Service (PHS) or the National Institutes of Health (NIH), as well as 
some industry-funded research regulated by the FDA. To CITI, the lack of 
transparency in research has a negative impact on the advancement of science and 
therefore on patients:   
“[Pharma companies] may seek to restrict publication, citing protection of 
proprietary information, in order to avoid advancing the work of competitors. 
They may conceal negative study findings by maintaining control of 
publication, or avoid disclosing adverse events and side effects to the public 
(though these are disclosed to the FDA). Restricted or partial publication 
increases the cost of clinical progress and can jeopardize the health of future 
study subjects and future patients. It also impedes or disrupts the work of 
other scientists whose work would otherwise improve, build on or impeach 
prior investigations.”18 
Expanding on the concerns expressed by CITI, the lack of communication, 
collaboration and transparency in the current paradigm of pharma R&D may 
contribute to a variety of problems including: 
1. Sub-optimal research design and analysis: As pharmaceutical company 
researchers do not freely share study design and analysis methodologies 
outside their organizations, and also because confidentiality inhibits 
regulators such as the FDA or EMA from directly sharing best practices 
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between drug developers, the broader community of researchers do not 
benefit from the knowledge of others. 
2. Redundant research: Different pharma companies that are developing 
similar drugs do not share results, particularly negative results which is akin to 
the issue of negative publication bias,19 and this can propel drug candidates 
much further down the development pathway before failing than they might 
have gone otherwise. Redundant and unnecessary clinical studies drive up 
the costs of failed drug candidates, which must then be recovered in the 
pricing of approved drugs.  
3. Trust: A Harris Interactive poll of approximately 1700 people in the US in 
2006 found that more than 85 percent of American adults believe that the 
FDA and pharma companies have at least “a fair amount” of responsibility for 
“ensuring drug safety”.20 However, only a fraction of those polled believed that 
the FDA (45 percent) or pharma companies (27 percent) could be trusted with 
drug safety. Moreover, only 14 percent of participants were “very confident” 
that pharma companies would eventually release data on drug safety, 
regardless of whether the data were positive or negative. This situation has 
led researchers to propose that greater transparency in pharma R&D could 
restore trust in the pharma industry and the therapies it produces.21 
In theory, problems #1 and #2 described above would tend to render pharma 
R&D less efficient and thereby increase the cost of developing drugs. Problem #3 
might compel pharma companies to invest more resources in advertising and 
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marketing than might otherwise be required to simply advertise drugs to providers 
and patients. Using data from 2004, Gagnon and Lexchin estimate that pharma 
companies each year spend twice as much on advertising and marketing as R&D, 
even when including additional public funding for R&D such as from the National 
Institutes of Health (NIH) and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC).22 The high cost of R&D, and even higher cost of advertising and marketing, 
is ultimately costs passed on to consumers. High drug costs limit access to 
consumers, and thus the cost of drug R&D is a population health issue.3 
  
 
 
Chapter 2: Review of the Literature 
The literature review for this research included three components, namely: 
1. Topic 1: The costs of pharma R&D under the current business model, to 
assess widely quoted estimates of $1 billion or more per each new approved 
drug; 
2. Topic 2: The relative cost of pharma R&D when compared with total cost of a 
prescription to the consumer; and 
3. Topic 3: The concept of open-source, crowd-sourcing, open-innovation, or 
open-science in pharma R&D. 
Literature Review Methods  
Search Strategy 
Initially, a search was done of PubMed and Web of Knowledge for peer-
reviewed articles published in English from 1980 to present using the following 
keywords: 
 pharmaceutical and drug development 
 pharmaceutical and drug research 
 medical device and diagnostic development and research 
 costs and expenditures 
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 open-source, open-science, and crowd-sourcing.  
These keywords were also used for a “grey” literature search of Google and Google 
Scholar to find reports, non-peer reviewed articles, presentations, editorials, and 
opinion pieces. Finally, the reference lists of potentially relevant articles were also 
reviewed to identify additional articles. 
Abstracts or summaries (when available) of potential articles were reviewed 
and included if they: 
1) contained directly collected or imputed data on pharmaceutical development 
costs; 
2) were in English; and 
3) were published from 1980 to 2011, although some included data prior to 
1980. 
Articles were excluded if they simply repeated data or analysis from other 
identified articles or were commentaries on pharmaceutical development costs, but 
presented no original data or analyses. 
It should be noted that a large portion of the information summarized here 
was gathered from “grey” literature, meaning newspaper, magazine, and web-based 
articles and editorials. This heavy weighting on the grey literature is due to two main 
factors: 
1) For searches #1 and #2 above, just as the pharma industry is not forthcoming 
with general information about its pharma R&D efforts, it is also guarded 
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concerning information on the cost of R&D. Therefore, there are little data, 
particularly in peer-reviewed journals, that address the first two questions 
described above.  
2) For search #3 above, the concept of open-source in computer development 
only began gaining momentum in the 1990s,42 and the theoretical or practical 
application of these concepts to pharma R&D is less than ten years old. 
Therefore, little has been published on the subject in any format, professional 
journals or grey literature. 
Topic 1: Cost of Pharmaceutical R&D 
Before it can be determined whether an OSRD approach could reduce 
pharmaceutical R&D costs, the first task it to understand of the cost of developing 
drugs under the current business model. Costs and timelines frequently referenced 
in editorials indicate that the average drug takes 12-15 years and costs $1 billion or 
more to progress from the research laboratory to an approved drug.  
Searches were conducted in PubMed, Web of Knowledge, and Google 
Scholar, generating the following number of potential references: 
 PubMed = 1 272 
 Web of Knowledge = 4 708 
 Google Scholar = “about 74 000” 
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The original number of potential references from Web of Knowledge and Google 
Scholar were too large to review completely. A cursory review showed that the 
initially proposed search terms were capturing many different types of medical 
therapy costs outside the cost of developing new therapies, including the price of 
drugs for hospital formularies, Medicare reimbursements, etc. Therefore, for Web of 
Knowledge the search terms were modified to attempt to make them more selective: 
“pharmaceutical research and development costs”. This modification reduced the 
potential references from Web of Knowledge to 753, which then were filtered on 
“articles” to remove reviews (183) and editorials (28). Ultimately, the search resulted 
in 439 potential articles, which were reviewed for relevance by title.    
For Google Scholar, the search term was revised to match Web of 
Knowledge, and the first 500 reference titles were then reviewed. This is admittedly 
an incomplete process, relying on Google’s proprietary and unknown algorithm to 
prioritize articles starting with the “closest” matches as determined by Google. 
However, the Google search did not reveal articles that were not already identified 
via Web of Knowledge, and therefore the risk of overlooking potential studies on 
R&D costs is small. 
Concurrently, Morgan et al.4 was used as a benchmark, where the authors 
recently completed a systematic review based on 13 articles published from 1979 to 
2010 (data from 1963 to 2010). The searches described above confirmed these 13 
references and all but one book chapter that could not be retrieved23 were reviewed 
directly. 
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In addition to these 13 articles, two additional references were identified and 
included in this literature review (Nunn 200624 and Gilbert 200325). If either reference 
were originally found by Morgan et al., they presumably were intentionally excluded. 
First, Nunn24 provided estimates for imaging agents, outside the scope of the 
Morgan et al. systematic review of pharmacotherapies. Gilbert et al.25 was a private 
report from a consulting company and the data sources and methods were not 
revealed, which may have made it incompatible with criteria for inclusion in the 
Morgan et al. review.     
In addition to these articles reporting cost estimates for pharmaceutical R&D, 
a number of editorials were noted, many stating concerns about the methodology 
and conclusions reported by the referenced articles. The main points of the editorials 
are summarized later in this literature review. 
In the 15 articles included in this review, four different methodologies were 
used to estimate the cost to develop a drug. Morgan et al. described them as 
follows: 
 Method 1: Retrospective cost accounting with project-level data; 
 Method 2: Retrospective econometric analysis with industry- or firm-level 
data; 
 Method 3: Retrospective cost accounting with industry-level data; or 
 Method 4: Prospective estimates of the cost of developing a hypothetical drug 
product. 
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Method 124,26,27,28,29,30,31,32,33 attempted to retrospectively gather data on the 
cost of each task billed to the development of a drug, such as the cost to conduct 
each study (IRB fees, investigator physician fees, etc.), and the cost to produce the 
drug and placebo needed for the various studies. By far the vast majority of studies 
cited used this methodology, and most analyses for Method 1 were conducted by 
the same core group of researchers27,28,29,30,31,32 or by others explicitly seeking to 
replicate their methods.24, 33 
Method 234,35 differs in that the technique is to a) estimate R&D costs, b) 
create a model showing how many drugs are being developed at what stage (pre-
clinical/non-human research, clinical, presumably including Phase I, II and III, etc.), 
and then c) use the model to estimate the incremental cost to develop an additional 
drug. 
Method 336 attempted to account for total costs over a specified period, but 
collected at the industry-wide level, meaning the costs for developing all drugs over 
five years (numerator). These industry-wide costs were then divided by estimates for 
the number of drugs developed during that same period (denominator), resulting in 
an estimate of the average cost of developing each drug in that period. 
Finally, Method 437 is similar to Method 1, except that the data were collected 
prospectively, using projected estimates of costs for each major task in the 
hypothetical development of a drug for tuberculosis. In both Methods 1 and 4, the 
stated goal was to capture the average cost to develop a single drug at a single 
pharmaceutical company. 
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Gilbert et al.25 did not describe their methods or original source data but are 
included here for completeness. 
A common feature of the four methods is that most researchers attempted to 
account for the cost of drugs that failed to reach the market, meaning that the costs 
to develop drugs that failed to be approved must be covered by the drugs that 
succeed. It is important to note that, regardless of method, most studies relied on 
confidential data supplied by industry, therefore making it impossible for any 
researcher to independently verify the ultimate source of the original data much less 
its accuracy.  
Table 1 summarizes results from the articles retrieved, stratified by the stage 
of development. 
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Table 1: Table of pharmaceutical development costs, with reference to data 
source and year, in $ millions 
Development Phase Cost in $ millions (Year) 
Discovery $600 (2003)
25
 
$674 (2010)
33
 
Pre-Clinical $80 (2003)
25 
$89 (1963-75)
b 
$150 (2010)
33
 
$264 (1970-82)
27,c 
$381 (2000)
34
 
$415 (1983-94)
30,c
 
$482 (1990-2003)
32,c
 
Phase I $100 (2003)
25
 
$273 (2010)
33
 
Phase II $300 (2003)
25
 
$319 (2010)
33
 
Phase III $73 (1963-75)
b,c,d
 
$314 (2010)
33
 
$487 (2000)
34,d
 
$500 (2003)
25
 
$578 (1983-94)
30,c,d
 
$965 (1990-2003)
32,c,d
 
Marketing $48 (2010)
33
 
$100 (2003)
25
 
Summary $753 - 1,778 
a
 Cumulative through NDA 
b
 Hansen – as reported using data from Morgan et al. (2011) 
c
 Morgan et al.(2011), capitalized into 2009 USD 
d
 Phase I, II, and III Clinical costs combined 
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Overall, almost all data reported in Table 1 were for pharmaceutical 
development. No articles were found for medical devices, and only one article 
estimated R&D costs for medical diagnostics ($135 million).24 Drug development 
costs varied tremendously over a time span of 40 or more years, with the low and 
high-estimate differing by approximately $1 billion (adjusted for inflation at least 
through the year 2000). Therefore, inflation did not account for the large variance in 
R&D cost estimates. 
Two articles sought to delineate costs by therapeutic areas such as 
cardiovascular, infectious disease, or oncology drugs. DiMasi et al.31, using 
retrospective cost accounting (Method 1), expanded upon the general results 
reported in their 2003 research30 with a breakout of clinical costs for the therapeutic 
categories of central nervous system (CNS), anti-infectives, cardiovascular, and 
analgesics. They reported a range in clinical costs $464 to $609 million with anti-
infectives being the most expensive to develop. Adams and Brantner38 used 
econometric modeling (Method 2) and delineated costs into several additional 
therapeutic categories, and reported that oncology, CNS, and pulmonary drugs were 
the most expensive to develop at over $1 billion each (2000 capitalized, clinical trial 
costs only, not overall R&D expenses). Table 2 provides a comparison of the two 
articles’ main results, adjusting for inflation through the year 2000. 
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Table 2. Clinical costs estimates by therapeutic category, in $ millions, 
adjusted for inflation for year 2000 
Category DiMasi et al
28 
$ millions  
Adams & Brantner38 
$ millions  
Blood - $906 
Cardiovascular $111 $887 
Dermatological - $677 
Genitourinary - $635 
HIV/AIDS $180a $540 
Cancer - $1,042 
Musculoskeletal - $946 
Neurological $100 $1,016 
Anti-parasitic - $454 
Respiratory - $1,134 
Sensoryb - $648 
Analgesic $114 - 
a
 General Anti-infectives, where HIV/AIDS is a sub-group  
b
 Sensory drugs are not defined by the authors, but are assumed to eye and/or ear drugs to treat 
conditions such as glaucoma and tinnitus  
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In reviewing Table 2, only three subgroups have head-to-head comparisons, 
cardiovascular, HIV/AIDS, and neurological, and the costs differences ranged from 
three fold (HIV/AIDS) to ten-fold (neurological). These wide differences render 
consensus impossible. In other words, there are no agreed trends in R&D costs 
differences depending on the therapeutic area or diseases researched.   
Summary of Costs of Pharmaceutical R&D 
There is general consensus that the average drug currently requires $1 billion 
or more and 12-15 years to gain approval. The true cost to develop drugs is 
important, as the high cost of R&D is used to partially justify the high cost of 
pharmacotherapies to consumers. With only 20 years of patent protection, 
pharmaceutical developers have only a few years remaining of patent life to recover 
development costs much less to make a profit to fund on-going and future R&D 
efforts.  
The articles summarized suggest that pharma R&D costs have risen 
dramatically since the 1960s, even when costs are adjusted for inflation. This rise in 
R&D costs is largely attributed to more drug candidates failing in later-stage trials, 
the higher cost of capital, and increased regulatory scrutiny requiring more, larger, 
and longer studies before a drug can be approved. This trend (rising R&D costs as 
the numerator) combined with a static or lower number of drugs being approved 
(denominator) results in substantially higher R&D costs per drug marketed. While 
there are reported differences in R&D costs depending upon the kind of diseases 
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treated or the type of company conducting the research (large pharma versus small 
biotech), there are far too few data to substantiate any conclusions.  
Concerns remain whether the data reported on R&D costs are accurate. Only 
one of the four methods has been repeated to any great extent, and primarily by the 
same core group of researchers. Regardless of the methodology used to estimate 
the R&D costs, two primary trends emerge: 
1. Despite the billions of dollars spent annually to develop hundreds of different 
pharmaceuticals, very few data are published on where and how these funds 
are used, and: 
2. For the little amount of data published, the original sources are usually 
unnamed and unverifiable. 
Therefore, while the conclusion that $1 billion and 12-15 years may or may 
not be substantively true, verified data to support this estimate are thin. Overall, 
information for pharmaceutical R&D costs is scarce; costs for devices and 
diagnostics is virtually nonexistent. 
The methods used to estimate the cost of pharmaceutical development are 
imprecise. These methods have been challenged, usually because the source data 
come from unnamed pharmaceutical companies, who presumably have a strong 
interest in maximizing R&D costs estimates in order to justify high product costs. 
Another criticism is that none of the four cost estimation methods account for 
government funding for R&D, such as through the NIH, tax incentives or other 
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rebates that pharma companies sometimes receive.36 Overall, regardless of the cost 
estimation methodologies, most assume that any biases would tend to overestimate 
costs. 
In conclusion, research on the cost of pharmaceutical development is 
criticized for many of the same reasons that R&D itself is attacked; that is, a lack of 
transparency coupled with a presumed bias towards skewing data in favor of 
maximizing profits and not patient benefit. The pharma industry can only address 
these concerns by improving transparency and allowing open access to independent 
parties to collect, analyze, and report R&D costs.20   
Topic 2: R&D Costs and the Overall Cost of Marketed 
Pharmaceuticals to Consumers 
Few estimates exist on the cost of R&D versus to total cost of a drug to 
consumers. The estimates also tend to be highly variable, as pharmaceutical 
companies are guarded about their spending practices. Figure 2 below, reproduced 
from the National Association of Chain Drug Stores (NACDS),39 therefore must be 
interpreted cautiously given the uncertainty of the actual costs of pharma R&D.  
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Figure 2: Average revenue from each prescription required to cover the costs 
of R&D, manufacturing, distribution, marketing, etc.  
 
From this figure a table was produced in order to calculate percentages (Table 3).  
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Table 3. Itemized costs contributing to the overall cost or a prescription from a 
retail pharmacy, based on NCADS estimates in Figure 2 
Item Cost ($)            % 
Manufacturer Cost of Materials 17.87  22.2 
Manufacturer SG&A 19.57  24.3 
Manufacturer R&D 11.95  14.8 
Manufacturer Taxes 5.40  6.7 
Manufacturer Total Profit 9.92  12.3 
Manufacturer Sub-total 64.71 80.4 
   
Wholesaler Operating Costs 0.62  0.8 
Wholesaler Taxes 0.39  0.5 
Wholesaler Net Profit 0.71  0.9 
Wholesaler Sub-total 1.72 2.1 
   
Retail Operating Costs 11.34  14.1 
Retail Taxes 1.67  2.1 
Retail Net Profit 1.09  1.4 
Retail Sub-total 14.10 17.5 
    
Total $80.53 100.0% 
   
% of R&D to manufacturer's costs  18.5% 
 
The NACDS estimates that the average prescription in 2010 cost $80.53, 
which was then divided into several categories such as cost of materials, R&D, 
taxes, etc. This figure shows that R&D costs equal $11.95, or 14.8% of the total cost 
to the drug developer when the $11.95 is divided by the $80.53 total. Using the 
$64.71 estimate of the total share of a prescription cost that goes to the pharma 
company, then the percentage of R&D to a pharma company’s costs is $11.95  ÷ 
64.71, or 18.5%. Other items that have a substantial impact on consumer drug costs 
include the cost of the raw materials (22.2%), selling, general, and administrative 
expenses (SG&A) (24.3%) and also profits (12.3%).  
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Other research in the grey literature suggests that the cost of the raw 
materials is much less (<1%)40 and state, but offer no data, that the proportion of 
R&D costs to the cost to consumer is much higher. It is important to note that the 
profits and SG&A are generated three times to account for the 1) manufacturer (drug 
company), 2) wholesaler (eg. McKesson, Cardinal, etc.)41, and 3) retailer (local 
pharmacies). Based on these scant data, reducing R&D costs by as much as 50% 
would therefore only reduce the cost to consumer by 7.5%, which would reduce the 
NACDS estimated average cost of a prescription from $80.53 to $74.49 without 
requiring pharma to reduce profits. Overall, given estimates of spending for 
pharmacotherapies reaching $1.2 trillion by 2016,10 a 7.5% reduction would equate 
to $90 billion in savings that could in theory be passed on to consumers each year. 
Topic 3: What is Open-Source Pharmaceutical R&D? 
There have been proposals for open-source drug discovery,33,42,43 where 
development of potential drug candidates would progress in a completely open-
source fashion, akin to open-source software development where the source code is 
not protected by patent. An example of open-source computer software 
development is a free and non-patented computer operating system called Linux,44 
comparable to computer operating systems that are patented and must be 
purchased such as Microsoft Windows™ and Apple OS™. Other terms referenced 
in the grey literature include “open innovation”, “crowd-sourcing” and “open-science”. 
In a completely open-source drug discovery model, researchers would have full 
access to all data on a potential molecule or compound, including patented or 
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normally patentable information such as its chemical structure and manufacturing 
techniques.  
The open-source drug discovery model is built upon two assumptions that 
would hinder its utility for broader pharma R&D, namely: 
1. Open-source drug discovery assumes that the model would be used only for 
unprofitable diseases where there is likely to be little or no commercial 
interests (e.g. neglected tropical diseases (NTD), “orphan” diseases);45 
2. Researchers pursuing open-source drug discovery into full clinical 
development would tend to be volunteers46 or perhaps supported by grants or 
government funding.42  
This model proposes that, after potential drug candidates are found during the 
drug discovery stage, then clinical development might then be conducted, with no 
pharmaceutical company funding, by a decentralized community of self-interested 
and self-funded scholars. Open-source drug discovery proponents acknowledge this 
approach might be relevant to only a small number of compounds targeted for 
NTDs, and therefore only benefit a relatively small number of people from a global 
population health perspective, albeit among the most underserved. 
The concept of open-source in the drug discovery stage is starting to be 
explored at large pharmaceutical companies and references to this can be found in 
the press such as this quote from the Wall Street Journal in 2011: 
 28 
 
“Scientists also had to keep their work secret, exploring new medicines 
without insight from outsiders. But companies can't keep a tight leash on their 
researchers if they expect to capitalize on the deepening understanding of 
how diseases happen, contends the chief executive of Sanofi SA, Christopher 
Viehbacher.” 47 
Although not stated explicitly, this comment may only have referenced the basic 
science and drug discovery stage in the laboratory, as opposed to the clinical 
development stage in humans. However, a more recent quote from Christopher 
Viehbacher as part of a press release from the CEO Roundtable on Cancer is clearly 
directed at the full scope of pharma R&D: 
“Broadly sharing existing clinical trial data for the benefit of all researchers 
can be a key driver in speeding up cancer research efforts, encouraging 
innovation, and honoring those patients who have participated in clinical trials 
as well as those future patients who deserve our very best collective efforts in 
discovering new and better therapies.” 48 
In addition, a 30 January 2012 press release from the Drugs for Neglected Diseases 
initiative (DNDi), announced that 11 large pharmaceutical companies (Table 4) are 
co-investing $785 million to support collaborative R&D efforts: 
“In the largest coordinated effort to date to combat NTDs, the group 
announced… that they would… share expertise and compounds to accelerate 
research and development of new drugs… Partners also… pledged new 
levels of collaborative effort and tracking of progress.” 49 
These quotes from Sanofi and the DNDi are examples of large pharma companies 
endorsing the sharing of information and know-how with a goal of improving the 
R&D process.  
Until recently there was little or no literature on the concept of open-source in 
the clinical development stage and/or on applying the concept to common diseases. 
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However, in September 2012, a consortium of ten large pharmaceutical companies 
(Table 4) created a not-for-profit, named TransCelerate Biopharma, to collaborate 
and share information:  
“with the end goals of improving the quality of clinical studies and bringing 
new medicines to patients faster. Through participation in TransCelerate, 
each of the ten founding companies will combine financial and other 
resources, including personnel, to solve industry-wide challenges in a 
collaborative environment.” 50 
 
Garry Neil, then interim CEO of TransCelerate stated,  
"There is widespread alignment among the heads of R&D at major 
pharmaceutical companies that there is a critical need to substantially 
increase the number of innovative new medicines, while eliminating 
inefficiencies that drive up R&D costs… Our mission at TransCelerate 
BioPharma is to work together across the global research and development 
community and share research and solutions that will simplify and accelerate 
the delivery of exciting new medicines for patients." 50 
TransCelerate and its academic partners intend to begin with five initiatives for 
collaboration which involve sharing information they deem to be “pre-competitive”. 
Pre-competitive appears to describe information that has traditionally been 
considered proprietary or “trade secrets” but not necessarily protected by patent. 
The five initiatives are: 
1. Creating a shared interface for investigator site portals, meaning web-sites 
that allow physicians and their staff who are participating in clinical trials to 
share information about their study(ies); 
2. Mutually recognizing study site qualification and training, to avoid a current 
problem where if a site such as a doctor’s office is working on five different 
studies with five different sponsoring pharmaceutical companies, site staff 
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might have to complete some of the same qualification procedures and 
training five times; 
3. Developing risk-based monitoring approaches and standards; 
4. Further developing clinical data standards; and 
5. Establishing a comparator drug model, where in many studies a potential new 
drug under investigation must be studied by comparing its safety and efficacy 
to that of an already approved drug.  
TransCelerate is an unparalleled initiative where pharmaceutical companies 
are seeking to collaborate and share information in a way that would benefit all drug 
development, not just NTD. However, open-science R&D, as proposed below, goes 
further than TransCelerate in that it contemplates the sharing of “competitive” 
information as well, e.g., protocols, study data, and regulatory interactions.  
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Table 4: Large pharmaceutical companies participating in the DNDi or 
TransCelerate as of 10 February 2012 
DNDia  TransCelerateb 
AbbVie (Abbott) 
Celgene 
Eisai 
Genzyme 
Gilead 
GNF Novartis 
GSK 
Merck 
Pfizer 
Sanofi 
Vertex 
 
 
AbbVie (Abbott) 
AstraZeneca 
Boehringer Ingelheim 
Bristol-Myers Squibb 
GSK 
Johnson & Johnson 
Lilly 
Pfizer 
Roche 
Sanofi 
 
a
 from www.dndi.org  
b
 from www.transceleratebiopharmainc.com  
bold denotes participants in both efforts  
  
 
 
Chapter 3: Conceptual Model and Research Questions 
Drug Development: Conceptual Model 
Pharmaceutical R&D follows the concept of the Scientific Method, 
encompassing the following four major components (Figure 3): 
Figure 3: Components of the scientific method 
 
The essential framework of the scientific method as shown in Figure 3 includes: 
Observation leading to a hypothesis, then to experiments, data gathering, analysis, 
and finally results that accept, partially accept, or reject the hypothesis. To this 
framework important additions have been made, including the concepts of 
transparency and reproducibility, perhaps dating back nearly 1000 years when 
scientist Roger Bacon “conducted his experiments in precise detail, perhaps with the 
idea that others could reproduce and independently test his results.” 51 
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Transparency, independent verification, and reproducibility are not widely 
practiced in for-profit pharma R&D, and therefore the current R&D process is in stark 
contrast to best practices in scientific research. As a result, the concept that optimal 
research should be transparent, reproducible, and conducted among the global 
community of scholars generally is not supported in for-profit medical research. 
Proposed Open-Science Research and Development Paradigm 
An open-science R&D (OSRD) paradigm as proposed in this research is not 
true “open-source” as understood by computer software developers and open-
source drug discovery proponents. In a completely open-source R&D model, even 
patented information would be widely shared, including the molecular structure and 
means of synthesis.  
Importantly, in the proposed open-science paradigm for pharma R&D, it is 
assumed that the discoverer and developer of the compound would still hold and 
keep proprietary any patent or patents, would fund R&D, and therefore could sell the 
drug or technology and seek profits if approved for marketing and distribution.  
The reasons for maintaining a patent-based, for-profit model are two-fold: 
1. To maintain profitability for developers in order to allay concerns that 
substantial profit erosion would undermine funding for future R&D, thereby 
reducing innovation in medical research. 
2. To modify the current open-source R&D paradigm to make it applicable for all 
pharmaceutical R&D, rather than only NTDs and orphan diseases where 
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there is typically much less interest and investment from pharma. Therefore, 
an open-science process could have a much larger impact on global 
population health in both the developed and less developed world. 
The proposed open-science model for pharma R&D would not be completely open-
source as the source (molecular structure and synthesis) would still be patent 
protected and proprietary. However, the process or “science” of developing a 
molecule would be open and transparent, hence the proposed label, Open-Science 
Research and Development (OSRD).  
The proposed OSRD process seeks to combine the concept of transparency 
and collaboration that is intertwined with the scientific method with the pharma R&D 
process. The underlying assumption is that the lack of transparency and 
collaboration in R&D reduces quality and efficiency, perhaps to the point of being 
financially negative, and that the efficiency and quality gained by an OSRD process 
may overcome any loss of competitive advantage that proprietary R&D is intended 
to protect. In short, the question is whether it is possible that more transparency and 
collaboration in for-profit pharma R&D could, under certain circumstances, be 
advantageous to patients as well as profitable to the pharma industry.  
To understand what information would be made transparent in an OSRD 
process, first consider what is and is not open or shared in the current R&D model. 
During pharmaceutical discovery and development, the following information is kept 
proprietary as much as possible (Table 5): 
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Table 5: Information typically patented and/or kept proprietary under the 
current pharmaceutical R&D paradigm 
 Molecular/Chemical Structure 
 Synthesis and Manufacturing Processes 
 Discovery process data such as in vitro laboratory testing (anti-viral activity, 
molecular binding, up and down-regulation of genes, computer modeling, etc.) 
 Pre-clinical and Clinical Development Plans including Study Protocols 
 Pre-clinical research (study designs, raw data, analysis)  
 Targeted Product Profiles, marketing research   
o Animal toxicity 
o Animal efficacy models when possible 
o Mechanism of Action 
 Clinical research (study designs, raw data, analysis) 
o Phase I (First-in-human, Clinical Pharmacology, etc.) 
o Phase II (Dose-finding, Proof of Concept) 
o Phase III (Efficacy) 
o Phase IV (Post-marketing) 
 All correspondence with regulators, including meeting minutes 
 Costs related to drug discovery and development, manufacturing, marketing and 
distribution 
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Most information and data described above are normally part of the 
Investigational New Drug (IND) application and are not obtainable under the 
Freedom of Information Act (FOI), even after the drug is approved.52 Some FDA 
materials and correspondence related to each drug candidate is discoverable after a 
drug has been approved, limited to parts of the actual New Drug Application (NDA) 
itself.  Also, high-level results of some pre-clinical and clinical studies are often 
presented at conferences or published in journals, but typically only if positive results 
are achieved. Such abstracts, presentations, and articles may contain rudimentary 
information on study designs and analyses, but are inadequate to allow independent 
verification of results.   
The proposed OSRD paradigm proposes to make transparent much of what 
is kept proprietary as outlined in Table 5 above, with the following exceptions: 
 Molecular/Chemical Structure 
 Synthesis and Manufacturing Processes 
 Some Clinical Trial Data and Analysis (until after un-blinding of treatment 
assignment in controlled, blinded studies). 
 
The purpose of keeping the first two items proprietary is so developers can protect 
the patents on their intellectual property and ultimately have a drug to sell if it is 
approved by regulators. Otherwise, other drug manufacturers could steal, 
manufacture and market the drugs, perhaps in other countries with lower regulatory 
standards or enforcement. The purpose of keeping the third item proprietary until 
after un-blinding is to avoid introducing bias into comparative clinical trials. 
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In the proposed OSRD process, all other information that makes up most of the IND 
and NDA, including study protocols, study data, analysis programs, IND safety 
updates, and written interactions with regulators, could be made available in an on-
going fashion during the R&D process. Full and timely disclosure of most of the 
contents of the IND could be made a pre-requisite for filing the NDA, thereby truly 
opening up the R&D process. 
In summary, this research examines whether an OSRD approach to 
pharmaceutical R&D could lead to better designed and more efficient drug 
development plans and processes, resulting in better study designs, higher quality 
data and analysis, and lower R&D costs.  
Research Questions 
Primary Research Question:  
 Overall, would an OSRD paradigm for pharma R&D be feasible and desirable 
in terms of process quality and efficiency, as defined by the key informants? 
Secondary Research Questions: 
 What are impressions of the current process of R&D in terms of process 
quality and efficiency? 
 Would OSRD have a positive, negative, or neutral impact on the quality of 
clinical research design, conduct, analysis, and results overall? 
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 Would OSRD have a positive, negative, or neutral impact on the efficiency 
(time and/or costs) of clinical research design, conduct, analysis, and results 
overall? 
 Regardless of whether or not the key informants support OSRD, do they 
recommend other and potentially better innovations applicable to pharma 
R&D? 
 What would the scientific, regulatory, legal, policy, financial and operational 
barriers be to implementing an OSRD approach? 
  
 
 
Chapter 4: Methods 
Data Source: Key Informant Interviews 
To answer the primary and secondary research questions, qualitative data 
were collected from key informants using a semi-structured questionnaire and 
interview format (Appendix 5). The choice of key informants and interview questions 
were intended to encompass the full range of information relevant to pharma R&D 
including patient privacy, intellectual property and patent law, regulatory oversight, 
science, healthcare financing, information technology, policy, politics and marketing. 
The key informant interview methodology is well suited for exploratory 
research such as a new and hypothetical OSRD paradigm. Moreover, the primary 
endpoints, pharma R&D quality and efficiency, at this time are ill-defined under the 
current R&D model, therefore providing no credible baseline on which to build a 
more quantitative research methodology.  
Finally, it would be impractical to rapidly pilot-test OSRD by applying it to 
some pharmaceuticals in development, and then comparing the efficiency and 
quality of OSRD versus pharmaceuticals developed under the traditional paradigm. 
In other words, there are currently no quantitative means by which to 
determine, for example, ‘an OSRD process would be XX% more or less expensive 
per approved drug,’ or ‘require YY more or less years to move from discovery to 
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approval.’ The qualitative key informant approach is therefore ideally suited to 
investigate a hypothetical pharma R&D process such as OSRD to assess its 
potential feasibility and acceptability.   
Identifying Key Informants 
Key informants were contacted 
representing three major stakeholder 
groups: academia, industry, and 
regulatory authorities, as shown in 
Figure 4. Academics were sought in 
order to gather feedback from 
researchers that were more likely to be 
open to innovations  that challenge the 
current drug R&D process. Industry representatives were interviewed as it was 
initially assumed that they would be the most invested in the status quo, the current 
drug development process, and therefore the most resistant to change. Moreover, 
pragmatically, it is unlikely that the pharma R&D process can be modified without 
buy-in from industry, and therefore it was important to gauge pharma’s appetite for 
change. Finally, regulators were interviewed because changes to the R&D process 
could have an impact on the future approvability of drug candidates, and therefore 
regulatory support for any major innovation is critical.   
Senior scientists, executives, and regulators were chosen from organizations 
such as the following: 
Figure 4: Stakeholder map 
for pharma R&D 
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Academia 
 Cleveland Clinic Coordinating Center for Clinical Research, Duke Clinical 
Research Institute, Harvard Clinical Research Institute, etc. 
 Various healthcare economics, financing, patient advocacy groups, and/or 
policy organizations (e.g. Open-Science In Drug Discovery, Clinical Trials 
Transformation Initiative) 
Industry 
 Pharmaceutical, device and/or diagnostic development companies, both 
“Large Pharma” and smaller “Biotechs” 
 Contract Research Organizations, to which pharmaceutical companies 
typically outsource R&D (e.g. Quintiles, PPD, PRA)  
Regulatory 
 US FDA, EMA 
Note that the above list of organizations is illustrative in order to protect the 
confidentiality of the key informants who actually participated in the interviews. The 
initial target number was 3-4 senior representatives from each stakeholder group or 
until saturation was reached. Saturation in this context refers to the situation where 
little or no new insights or information is gained from each additional key informant.53   
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Recruiting Key Informants 
The process for recruiting potential key informants included the following 
steps: 
1. Potential participants were contacted via e-mail or letter (Appendix 1) to 
ascertain interest in participating in research regarding general innovations to 
the current paradigm for pharma R&D.  
2. Potential participants were provided with a brief description of the proposed 
hypothetical OSRD model (Appendix 2). 
3. Potential participants were given an Informed Consent Form (Appendix 3) 
prior to seeking verbal consent and encouraged to contact the researcher 
with any questions or concerns regarding participation. Verbal consent was 
obtained immediately prior to conducting an interview. 
4. Thirty-to-60 minute interviews were scheduled and conducted in-person or 
over the telephone.  
IRB Review 
As the key informants were not a vulnerable population, the information 
sought in the interviews was not particularly sensitive, and the likelihood of breach of 
confidentiality was low, the UNC Biomedical Institutional Review Board (IRB) 
granted an exemption on 4 June 2012 for the key informant interviews and approved 
a request for a verbal consent process (Appendix 6).  
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Confidentiality Issues 
In order to protect the confidentiality of the key informants, information about 
their roles and experience was reported in the aggregate. Many participants had 
multiple degrees, but only one degree was reported. Masculine pronouns (he, his) 
were used regardless of the sex of the participant. Finally, when referring to 
someone’s role such as CEO, Senior Regulator, or Academician, the active tense is 
used, suggesting that they were in the stated role during the time of the interview 
even though they may not have been (e.g. retired). The title or role reported 
represents the highest or the longest role in duration in their careers at the time of 
the interview.   
Also, throughout the paper attributed quotes are used, for example in the 
Review of the Literature and also the Discussion chapters. Note that none of the 
attributed quotes came from people who were also key informants for the research.  
Data Collection Procedures 
Interviews were recorded when permitted by the respondents and notes taken 
by the interviewer in all cases. In some cases, the key informants referenced or 
provided additional materials to support their comments. Immediately after the 
interview, the interviewer clarified and/or amended the interview notes (Appendix 4). 
All recorded interviews were transcribed. To protect key informant 
confidentiality, all transcripts (Microsoft Word documents) were password protected, 
the key informant’s identifying information (title, employer, etc.) were deleted, and 
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their names were replaced with a letter/number code. The key for identifying which 
code corresponded to which interview was maintained in a password-protected 
Microsoft Excel file.   
Data Management and Analysis Plan 
The transcribed interviews were coded and analyzed manually, using the 
Coding Manual developed for this research and presented in Appendix 7. The 
quotations reported here are predominately verbatim, with minimal editing in order to 
remove information that might compromise the confidentiality of the participant. 
When such edits occur to directly quoted responses, the edits are identified by 
brackets such as [edited text inserted by researcher] and/or ellipses […] to represent 
deleted material. Furthermore, the quotations imbedded in the text of the dissertation 
at times were edited to improve flow and clarity while seeking to avoid any corruption 
of the key informant’s intent. However, the transcribed quotations in Appendices 8 - 
10 are excerpted from the interviews but generally not edited for flow or clarity.   
  
 
 
Chapter 5. Results 
Characteristics of Interviews and Key Informants  
Sixteen potential key informants were contacted; one regulatory 
representative did not respond to the recruitment e-mail and one academic 
representative agreed to be interviewed by telephone but did not attend as 
scheduled. Attempts to reschedule were unsuccessful. Therefore, fourteen 
interviews were conducted between 18 June and 10 December 2012. Ten of 14 
interviews were conducted by telephone, and all but one key informant agreed to 
have their interview audio recorded. One participant asked for and received the 
interview questions in advance and provided a written response prior to the 
interview, which then proceeded as planned. A summary of the interviews and the 
key informants’ backgrounds is provided in Table 6. 
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Table 6. Key informant backgrounds (stakeholder group, years of experience, 
highest degree obtained) and interview characteristics (interview time, format, 
and whether recorded) 
# 
Stakeholder 
Group 
Years of 
Experience 
Highest  
Degree 
Interview 
Time 
(Minutes) 
In-person 
or 
Telephone 
(F2F or T) 
Audio 
Recorded 
(Y/N) 
1 Academia 40 PhD 76 F2F Y 
2 Academia 20 MD 30 T Y 
3 Academia 21 MD 35 T Y 
4 Industry 31 PhD 60 T Y 
5 Industry 25 PhD 36 F2F Y 
6 Industry 20 MS 31 T Y 
7 Industry 30 BA 25 T Y 
8 Industry 30 MD 63 T Y 
9 Industry 32 MD 76 F2F Y 
10 Industry 20 PhD 90 F2F Y 
11 Industry  30 BA 48 T N 
12 Regulatory 12 MD 25 T Y 
13 Regulatory 40 MD 28 T Y 
14 Regulatory 26 MD 34 T Y 
 
Three key informants each were interviewed representing the academic and 
regulatory stakeholder groups, whereas the remaining eight have spent the majority 
of their careers in industry, either at CROs and/or in pharma companies. Aggregate 
data on the key informants and interviews are reported in Table 7: 
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Table 7. Aggregated data on key informants and interviews 
Variable Category   n  Percentage 
      
Stakeholder Group Academia  3  21.4% 
 Industry  8  57.2% 
 Regulatory  3  21.4% 
 Total  14  100.0% 
      
Sex Male  9  64.3% 
 Female  5  35.7% 
 Total  14  100.0% 
 
 
   
 Race Caucasian  14  100.0% 
 Total  14  100.0% 
 
 
   
 Degree MD  7  50.0% 
 PhD  4  28.6% 
 Other  3  21.4% 
 Total  14  100.0% 
 
 
   
 Consented for Audio Yes  13  92.9% 
 No  1  7.1% 
 Total  14  100.0% 
 
 
   
 Interview Format Telephone  10  71.4% 
 F2F  4  28.6% 
 Total  14  100.0% 
      
Age (years) Mean    60.3 
 Range    49-72 
      
Drug R&D Experience  (years) Mean    25.9 
 Range    12-40 
      
Interview Length (minutes) Mean    44.7 
     25-90 
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Two-thirds of key informants were male and all were Caucasian. Over three-
quarters had an MD and/or PhD. The three regulatory representatives were very 
senior officials, and the three academicians were tenured, full professors or 
equivalent. Among the eight industry participants, five were Chief Executive Officers 
(CEOs) and/or Presidents of their respective companies, one was a Chief Medical 
Officer (CMO) in small Pharma and a CRO, and two were Vice Presidents (VPs) in 
large pharma. All but one participant had at least 20 years of experience in drug 
development.  
As will be shown in the results that follow, there was a high-level of 
consistency and overlap among the interviewers, thus suggesting that data 
saturation was reached. Moreover, when designing the study methods, it was 
presumed that academics and regulators would tend to be supportive of greater 
transparency and collaboration, whereas industry representatives would tend to be 
more critical of OSRD. Therefore, it was possible that data saturation could be 
reached with a small number of academic and regulatory participants. However, 
support for OSRD and similar innovations was higher than anticipated among the 
industry representatives interviewed. Therefore, although data saturation was 
reached earlier in the data collection process, additional industry representatives 
were interviewed in order to uncover if possible critical and opposing views to 
OSRD.   
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Key Topics and Findings 
Several topical areas emerged from the interviews based on the questions 
asked (Appendix 5). Seven major topics discussed included the key informant’s 
responses to: 
I. Current state of pharma R&D; 
II. Potential impact of OSRD on pharma R&D quality; 
III. Potential impact of OSRD on pharma R&D efficiency (time and costs); 
IV. Other potential impacts of OSRD; 
V. Other innovations than OSRD that should be considered; 
VI. Barriers to implementing OSRD to more mainstream pharma R&D; and 
VII. Opportunities for implementing OSRD to more mainstream pharma R&D. 
Each topic is discussed below, with quotes from the key informants whenever 
relevant, and with additional quotations provided as noted in Appendices 8, 9 and 
10.  
I. Impressions on the Current State of Pharma R&D 
Each interview began with a question about the participant’s views on the 
current state of pharma R&D in terms of quality and efficiency, to serve as a 
baseline with which to compare potential innovations including OSRD. The 
responses were generally favorable in terms of the quality of R&D as it is conducted 
today. For example, one large Pharma VP stated:  
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“pharmaceutical R&D process as it is practiced by major ethical 
pharmaceutical companies is one of very high integrity.” VP, Large Pharma 
The context here was that the quality of R&D is very high, particularly in regards to 
patient safety and data quality. The head of a CRO stated that he believes: 
“there is sincere intent for high quality throughout all sectors of pharma R&D.” 
CEO, CRO 
Likewise, a CMO from a large CRO commented favorably on quality in the current 
approach to R&D: 
“From the standpoint of a) scientific rigor, and b) the necessary controls 
around ensuring that from the very beginning of discovery all the way through 
to regulatory approval and use of a product in humans, I would grade the 
quality of it around 80 – 90%. It meets the mark in terms of internal control 
over what works, what doesn’t work, why it doesn’t work, and drugs washing 
out of the development program because they don’t meet milestones.” CMO, 
CRO 
However, in contrast, a large pharma representative was more cautious, stating that 
he had: 
“more ethical concerns” and that “the danger now is that decisions are made 
at a higher level, possibly with more business interest than quality and patient 
safety.” VP, Large Pharma  
This large pharma VP expressed concerned that when business interests override 
ethical concerns, this can lead to problems such as with Avandia™ (rosiglitazone), a 
diabetes drug where a pharmaceutical company pled guilty to intentionally 
withholding negative safety data to improve likelihood of approval.54  
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However, when asked about the efficiency of the current pharma R&D model, 
in terms of costs and time, the key informants were almost universally negative. The 
negative feedback included: 
“The clinical side of it keeps getting longer. Well, not so much longer, but 
costlier and with poorer success rates. That is a big concern.”  Academician 
 
“R&D is very slow” and the “costs are ungodly”.  VP, Large Pharma 
 
“It’s terrible because it is so costly and [pharma has] such poor success rates 
– the predictability of their models are so bad”. Senior Regulator, FDA 
Countering this nearly unanimous criticism only one participant, a VP from 
large pharma, had more positive feedback on the efficiency of R&D as it is currently 
practiced, stating: 
“The issue of whether the system itself is efficient or not… the processes 
themselves have, in the short run, a tendency to be somewhat less efficient, 
but in the long run, in the end, when you stretch it out and calculate it, it is 
probably sufficient in order to support the value proposition and the 
investment.” VP, Large Pharma 
When prompted with published concerns that the current drug development process 
is too inefficient to be sustainable,1 this same VP replied:  
“This is the most profitable industry in the history of free enterprise. The 
profitability in the pharmaceutical business is extremely high... So, I do not 
[agree with] people saying that the cost of the pharmaceutical R&D is not 
sustainable.” VP, Large Pharma 
In summary, the general consensus was that the current process for pharma 
R&D is good in terms of quality, particularly when quality is defined as pharma 
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researchers exhibiting ethical behavior and a high regard for patient safety. 
However, even with the very positive views expressed by one VP from large 
pharma, the overwhelming view was that the current process for pharma R&D is 
very inefficient and unsustainable in terms of costs and time. 
Additional comments on the efficiency of the current pharma R&D process 
are in Appendix 8. 
II. Advantages and Disadvantages of OSRD for R&D Quality 
Key informants were then reminded of the proposed OSRD paradigm and 
asked to consider whether OSRD could have a positive, negative, or neutral impact 
on R&D in terms of quality and efficiency. Beginning with quality, nine of the 14 
participants (64.3%) indicated that they thought that an OSRD approach would have 
a positive effect, with over 35% indicating a neutral or negative effect (Table 8). 
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Table 8. Potential effect of OSRD in terms of R&D quality (positive, negative, or 
neutral); Aggregated for all participants 
Effect n % 
Positive 9 64.3 
Negative 1 7.1 
Neutral 4 28.6 
Total 14 100 
 
Next, to explore whether there were different perspectives between 
stakeholder groups, responses where broken out as reported in Table 9. 
Table 9. Potential effect of OSRD in terms of R&D quality (positive, negative, or 
neutral); by stakeholder group 
 
Positive 
n 
(%) 
Negative 
n 
(%) 
Neutral 
n 
(%) 
Total 
n 
(%) 
Academia 2 0 1 3 
 (66.7) (0.0) (33.3) (100) 
     
Industry 4 1 3 8 
 (50.0) (12.5) (37.5) (100) 
     
Regulatory 3 0 0 3 
 (100) (0.0) (0.0) (100) 
     
Total 9 1 4 14 
 (64.3) (7.1) (28.6) (100) 
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These data suggest that regulators and to a lesser degree academicians 
perceive that OSRD would have a generally positive impact on the quality of R&D, 
whereas industry representatives opinions were split. While four industry participants 
felt positive about OSRD and the potential impact on study quality, an equal number 
were neutral (three) or negative (one). For the neutral participants, a concept 
expressed by all three was that quality of R&D was already very high, therefore the 
potential for any innovation, OSRD or otherwise, to improve quality is limited.  
Industry perspectives on any positive, negative or neutral impacts of OSRD 
on quality were varied, as is evidenced by these three quotes: 
[If when you say] quality, you mean more information that would lead to better 
decision making or better outcomes, the answer would be yes. I don’t know if 
it would improve the quality of the study from the perspective of data quality, 
but certainly more information is always better than less. CEO, CRO 
Would [OSRD] produce a higher quality? The answer is no because I believe 
that the quality has to be built into the system from the integrity point of view. 
Would it impact integrity? I do not think so… [Therefore] I do not think it would 
have an effect on quality at least as I define it. VP, Large Pharma 
I think that the impact on quality would be neutral, in terms of research 
design, conduct, analysis, and results… those terms seem more related to 
efficiency than quality. President, CRO 
Therefore, there was no clear consensus that more transparency and collaboration 
would have an impact on R&D quality.  
Additional quotes from all three stakeholder groups regarding OSRD and 
quality are in Appendix 9.   
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III. Advantages and Disadvantages of OSRD for R&D Efficiency 
Overall, the key informant comments reflected a strong but not unanimous 
belief that OSRD would have a positive impact on efficiency (Table 10). 
Table 10. Potential effect of OSRD in terms of R&D efficiency (positive, 
negative, or neutral); Aggregated for all participants 
 
Effect n % 
Positive 12 85.7 
Negative 1 7.1 
Neutral 1 7.1 
Total 14 100 
 
Much more than the question regarding OSRD and quality, over 85% of 
participants expressed that OSRD would have a positive impact on R&D efficiency, 
meaning that it could reduce the current average time to gain approval to less than 
12-15 years and reduce the current average costs from approximately $1 billion. 
Importantly, no key informant estimated the potential reductions, only that OSRD 
would likely have a positive impact of indeterminate magnitude.   
Next, to explore whether there were different perspectives between 
stakeholder groups, responses were broken out and reported in Table 11. 
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Table 11. Potential effect of OSRD in terms of R&D efficiency (positive, 
negative, or neutral); by stakeholder group 
 
Positive 
n 
(%) 
Negative 
n 
(%) 
Neutral 
n 
(%) 
Total 
n 
(%) 
Academia 2 0 1 3 
 (66.7) (0.0) (33.3) (100) 
     
Industry 7 1 0 8 
 (87.5) (12.5) (37.5) (100) 
     
Regulatory 3 0 0 3 
 (100) (0.0) (0.0) (100) 
     
Total 12 1 1 14 
 (85.7) (7.1) (7.1) (100) 
 
Here there was a higher degree of consensus among the stakeholder groups, 
with only one academic and one industry representative expressing views other than 
positive. The negative view was that OSRD could lead to information overload as 
well as data misinterpretation by unqualified reviewers: 
“[With OSRD], you would have a ton of data that you have to interpret 
somehow if you took it to its extreme [where] every single thing that the 
pharmaceutical company did would be public. That would be a disaster, 
because people cannot interpret data, animal safety data for example. There 
are multiple cases where you get some horrible toxicity in an animal and you 
find out that that particular species produces a metabolite that no other 
species including man produces and you are only going to see that toxicity in 
that species, but you find that out later on.  
Therefore, it depends on who has access to the data and who is doing the 
interpreting and there is so much “crack-pot” science out there. All you need 
to do is look at everything from rejuvenation to penis enlargement. There is a 
lot of misinformation and a lot of misinterpretation of data. There would be too 
much data and it would be overload.”  CEO, Small Pharma 
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This pharma executive went on to say: 
“There is a premise there, I am not saying I disagree with, but also I am not 
saying it is true, and that is the odds of success in pooling the data go up 
enough to cover the decrease in return. I do not think that would happen. If 
you put five companies together, instead of getting one wise entity you simply 
have five entities coming together and still muddling through.”  CEO, Small 
Pharma 
This concern was mirrored by another in industry, where overall he thought that 
OSRD would improve efficiency but expressed this caution: 
Now on the efficiency side, it is hard to argue that it would not be more 
efficient. The more information one has to consider in making your own 
decisions about the most efficient/cost effective and resource effective 
pathway to get to the end zone, the better… I think it is almost unarguable 
that it would be more efficient. 
But, it could have one of two effects. Either it could be refreshingly revelatory 
and could encourage people to be hyper vigilant about the quality of the work 
that they do or it could have exactly the opposite effect and all work would 
essentially grind to a halt because [pharma would] be afraid of exposing a 
vulnerability.”  CMO, CRO 
These two key informants above voiced profound skepticism about OSRD, to the 
point that OSRD could be less efficient than the current paradigm. However, the vast 
majority of opinions across all three stakeholder groups were strongly positive, 
including: 
“So I think in process innovation, [OSRD] can be very valuable… clearly can 
be very profitable at a very early stage, very useful, fruitful at a very early 
stage. I think it could be significant… I think there is a lot that could be done 
to speed up the process and also to make it more targeted… if you could 
decrease cost by 20%, that is a couple hundred million dollars.”   
Academician  
“[OSRD] is definitely beneficial. There are currently a number of areas where 
investments by companies are duplicative, even if they are each aiming for 
somewhat different molecules.”  Senior Regulator 
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“It is illogical to me to say we believe that the [OSRD] model is right for 
orphan or niche diseases [but not] also be right for bigger diseases. We are 
seeing with these orphan diseases data that improves the outcome in terms 
of approval times, time to market, and patient benefit. [Therefore], I find it 
illogical to say that the benefits [of OSRD] should not be extended to broader 
populations.”  CEO, Large Pharma 
This last quote from the CEO expresses a critical view as it directly addresses the 
question of whether OSRD could be beneficial for orphan indications but not for all 
indications. The CEO of a top-ten pharma company considers but then rejects this 
possibility.  
Therefore, although concerns were raised, the vast majority of academic, 
industry, and regulatory representatives viewed OSRD as potentially beneficial in 
terms of improving the process of pharma R&D, thereby leading to quicker approvals 
and lower costs. Further comments on potential advantages and disadvantages of 
the proposed OSRD paradigm on efficiency are in Appendix 10.   
IV. Other Potential Impacts of OSRD 
In addition to providing feedback on the potential impact of an OSRD 
approach on R&D quality and efficiency, several key informants commented on 
OSRD and public relations and also on whether OSRD undervalues scientific know-
how.  
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Public Relations 
As noted in the Introduction, trust in the pharma industry is low and two key 
informants spoke about the value of more transparency helping the pharma industry 
overcome its negative image as untrustworthy. In recalling that pharma spends more 
for marketing than R&D, perhaps in small part to help burnish its poor reputation 
among physicians and patients, the participants responded: 
“[OSRD] can help pharma from a public relations perspective, just like 
pharma tries to do with humanitarian efforts, to show that pharma cares about 
patients, not just profits.” CEO, CRO  
“I think the impact of OSRD could be significant. Not only increasing the trust 
in the [R&D] process, but also showing a real desire for sharing of knowledge 
would be positive.” VP, Large Pharma 
The VP of the large pharma company quoted above further commented that the 
public relations impact might be the most beneficial aspect of an OSRD approach, 
regardless of whether OSRD would reduce costs and development time.  
Placing Value in the Molecule versus R&D “Know-how”  
One key informant from industry correctly noted that the proposed OSRD 
paradigm places all of the value of a drug in development on the molecule itself. In 
other words, if the molecule is highly effective and has few side effects, then its 
value should be very high and, likewise, if the drug is ineffective and has many 
dangerous side effects, the value should be low. However, OSRD places little value 
in the “know-how” of pharma R&D, such as using scientific creativity to determine 
the optimal disease endpoints to study and the best study-designs for demonstrating 
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a positive drug effect. The proposed OSRD paradigm would continue to protect the 
structure of the molecule and means of synthesis (the intrinsic value of the 
molecule), but would not protect information on the process of designing, 
implementing, and analyzing study results (the intrinsic value of scientific know-
how). OSRD also places no value on marketing. The CEO comments: 
“The problem [with the proposed OSRD model] is that you are focusing on 
intellectual property (IP) when know-how and working knowledge are 
sometimes more important. So, if all your know-how and working knowledge 
are public, then it becomes potentially less attractive for an investor to invest 
in [a compound].”  CEO, Small Pharma      
However, this view was countered by other key informants, one each from 
industry and regulatory. The regulator raised concerns that valuing know-how 
actually undermines pharma R&D as a pursuit grounded in science, saying: 
“The hallmark of science is the data are put in a public domain, they have to 
be replicable and they have to be subjected to rigorous, relentless scientific 
criticism and scrutiny and that is where the drug industry has erred over the 
past thirty or forty years because their practices and principles have been in 
secret. None of R&D has been out in the daylight and therefore we have not 
advanced science. We have advanced practitioners of the art [of pharma 
R&D], and maybe some practitioners are masters. They are craft masters, but 
not [scientists].”  Senior Regulator   
A CEO from large pharma rebutted the argument that OSRD undervalues 
know-how by simply stating that the value of a potential drug: 
“…will be determined by the real profile of that drug once it gets into real 
clinics. That is where [pharma] should compete… profitability to me in this 
business should be, and I think increasingly is, directly proportional to the real 
innovation and the added benefit we bring to a patient.”  CEO, Large Pharma 
Then later in the same interview, this CEO from large pharma further expressed: 
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“I fully encourage my industry colleagues [to accept that] IP is IP. If you have 
good intellectual property, you will be recognized for that intellectual 
property.”  
In other words, this CEO from large pharma agrees that OSRD does not place much 
value in know-how, but then states clearly that the value of a therapy should be in 
the molecule itself and whether it benefits patients, not in scientific know-how and 
marketing. 
V. Potential Innovations other than OSRD 
Each key informant was asked to comment on potential innovations other 
than OSRD that should be considered, whether or not the participant supported the 
concept of OSRD. The question read: 
“Discussions about OSRD are essentially about innovating and improving 
clinical research. Are there other and potentially better innovations that should 
be considered?” Interview Question 
As the key informants were very senior representatives of pharma R&D, the intent of 
the question was not only gather new ideas, but to also gauge OSRD’s relevance in 
the broader context of pharma R&D innovations.  
However, no key informants responded with substantively different proposals. 
One participant noted:  
“There are lots of opportunities for creativity and innovation [in basic science 
and drug discovery], but when we get into the development sciences, 
particularly the clinical and regulatory sciences, there are not too many ways 
left to skin the cat.” VP, Large Pharma 
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In fact, the two most innovative proposals from industry representatives involved 
expanding the proposed OSRD model, as opposed to avoiding an OSRD approach. 
In one instance, a VP from large pharma recommended that OSRD stakeholders be 
broadened to include the payers, meaning that both public payers (Medicare, 
Medicaid) and private insurance companies should be part of a more transparent 
approach.   
In the world we live in now, clinical and regulatory science is no longer the 
front runner for success. It used to be, but now it is not. Now it is payer 
reimbursement and market access… [Therefore, with OSRD], the 
collaborators could come together and define the criteria [to test safety and 
efficacy] and propose these to both the payers and the regulatory agencies.”  
VP, Large Pharma 
It should be noted that this same VP in large pharma at first maintained that the 
current pharma R&D model did not require significant innovation, as it is “the most 
profitable industry in the history of free enterprise” but later in the interview 
recommended that OSRD be expanded to include payers as a key stakeholder. 
The other enhancement proposed for OSRD envisions a process where drug 
developers would develop potential therapies only through proof of concept (POC), 
or Phase I/II clinical trials. All the information collected to support a successful POC 
would be made public, so that the potential safety and efficacy could be assessed in 
an open and transparent environment. Then, the most promising compounds would 
undergo Phase III testing by researchers that the key informant referred to as 
“clinical research utilities”, perhaps with some similarities to other public utilities such 
as electric power or water treatment companies. He described these “utilities” as 
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research consortia that could be funded by pharma or government but do not profit 
by the sales of any approved drugs. In this R&D model, all profits would be realized 
at the end of POC. As with the POC data, the results of Phase III testing and 
interactions with regulators also would be made public.  
The costs that accrue after POC (Phase III clinical trials, manufacturing, 
patient and provider education, and distribution) would determine the costs to 
consumers and would not include additional profits. Note that the key informant that 
suggested this approach, a CEO of small pharma, initially was by far the most 
skeptical that OSRD could have any benefit or is practicable. Nevertheless, when 
asked to suggest alternatives to OSRD, he responded with the modified OSRD 
approach that relied on “clinical research utilities” and then stated:  
“I think that, if I were a dictator of the world, I would probably give a try or at 
least analyze the [modified OSRD] model that we just talked about.”  CEO, 
Small Pharma 
The overall result of the question regarding other potential innovations was 
that additional innovations were not championed. This conclusion reinforces the 
concept that OSRD has the potential be substantially innovative and positively 
impactful in improving the efficiency of pharma R&D, and perhaps the only viable 
new option available to “skin the cat”, as phrased by one key informant.  
VI.  Barriers to Implementing OSRD 
To many of the key informants, broader transparency and collaboration may 
be a too radical divergence from the standard practices in the pharma industry. 
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Therefore, even exploring the OSRD concept would be unacceptable, regardless of 
whether it might be beneficial in terms of quality, time, or costs. In the words of a VP 
from large pharma, even the potential of a negative impact on competition and 
maximizing profits would render OSRD a non-starter: 
“Anything that is going to [be perceived to] diminish the incentive of the 
industry to develop drugs is counter-productive… if you lose your proprietary 
interest or competitive advantage it would make the drug far less competitive 
and therefore that is your biggest impediment to [OSRD] ever being adopted.” 
VP, Large Pharma  
Likewise, an academic who expressed that he was very much in favor of OSRD 
regulations from an ethical and public health point of view, was also skeptical about 
OSRD: 
“I am in favor of greater transparency, but I am in favor of greater 
transparency by forcing greater transparency. I have been an advocate for 
laws and rules about hiding data that are of value to the public health… 
However, [any greater transparency has] been achieved with the industry 
kicking and screaming the entire way. Not because [the pharma industry] 
thinks it is in their interest.”  Academician 
This academician felt strongly that the possibility that industry could ever voluntarily 
embrace OSRD was so unrealistic as to not merit serious consideration, declaring: 
“Oh come on, [voluntarily implementing OSRD] is the silliest thing I have ever 
heard. They have all the moral fiber of convicted criminal… it is not going to 
happen. It is not the way the industry works.”  Academician  
The view that the pharma industry would only collaborate and share information if 
required by laws or regulations was echoed by a regulatory representative: 
 65 
 
“I do think it would be hugely helpful although I think that there are legal 
barriers to doing this. [Industry] would have a fleet of lawyers throwing 
themselves on the Capitol steps [of Congress] demonstrating.”  Regulator  
Therefore, representatives from all three stakeholder groups believed the 
chief barrier to OSRD would be industry concerns regarding a potential negative 
impact on profits and that such resistance to any change is entrenched. Moreover, 
assuming that any innovation cannot be empirically proven to improve efficiency a 
priori, then these key informants opined that industry would resist any unproven 
innovation, including OSRD: 
“No one has ever really tested it. And who is going to stick their neck out to 
test it? [OSRD] is a theory. There is no tangible, measureable effect and so 
you would ask the pharma industry, on the basis of blind faith, to be willing to 
put our information in the public domain because we think it might have 
benefit.”   Academician      
This barrier should be coupled with the concerns raised in the OSRD and Efficiency 
results above, namely information overload and fear of exposing vulnerabilities 
about a pharma developer’s compound (Section III).  
Therefore, in summary, four barriers were proposed by the key informants, 
including concerns about: 1) information overload, 2) negative impact on 
competiveness in general and on maximizing profits in particular, 3) keeping 
information proprietary is too entrenched in the pharma industry to ever change, and 
4) any benefits of OSRD being unproven. As stated by participants from academia 
and industry, simply the potential for negative impacts is enough to keep industry 
from meaningfully considering OSRD. 
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VII. Opportunities for Implementing OSRD 
However, throughout the interviews the key informants also provided 
examples of how proponents for more transparency and collaboration could address 
and, in some cases, already are addressing the barriers noted above.  
Overcoming Barriers: Information Overload 
One key informant asked during the interview what barriers were being 
proposed by the other participants, and when told of the concerns about too much 
data leading to “analysis paralysis”, he dismissed the concerns by responding:  
“In response to the concern of information overload, you always have a 
choice about what pieces of information you want to spend a lot of time 
analyzing and pursuing. I would rather be given the choice of looking at as 
much information I chose to look at rather than being in a position where I 
was not allowed to look at some information that might be helpful.”  CEO, 
Large Pharma 
Overcoming Barriers: Negative Impact on Profits 
In Section III above, “OSRD and Efficiency”, the vast majority of key 
informants felt that more transparency and collaboration would have a positive 
impact on efficiency and costs, and therefore on overall profitability. Thus, historical 
assumptions regarding the value of keeping information proprietary may be giving 
way to theories that information sharing can improve efficiency and therefore be 
positive to profitability. This softening of concerns about OSRD and profit-erosion 
among the senior leaders of pharma R&D is reflected in following observation from 
an industry representative: 
“I think there is openness to it now that five years ago frankly would not have 
been there.”  CEO, Small Pharma      
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Overcoming Barriers: Keeping Most Information Proprietary is Entrenched 
Several key informants expressed reservations that the pharma industry 
could ever be flexible to OSRD, as the practice of keeping most information 
proprietary is entrenched, even information not protected by patents. However, 
representatives from all three stakeholder groups pointed out that much of the 
information pharma attempts to protect is, in practice, not kept proprietary. The three 
following quotes support this view: 
“There really is not that much in the way of true trade secrets.” CEO, Large 
Pharma 
 
“[The FDA] would like to aggressively narrow what is considered 
commercially confidential or a trade secret. For example, [pharma companies 
give] the protocol out to all the investigators. It is just hard to imagine how it 
could be that confidential. All the IRBs see it. It is a fiction that the protocol is 
a heavily guarded secret.” Regulator 
 
“Solving the challenges of designing the protocols and collecting and 
analyzing the data, I know people have treated it as proprietary in the past, 
but to some extent that is a farce. We need to be explicit about that. In 
addition, this idea of confidentiality is getting in the way all over the place. I 
know it is not enforceable, people have these confidentiality agreements that 
just are not enforced.” Academician  
This academic was then asked, if keeping information proprietary is not enforceable, 
would more transparency and collaboration be positive, neutral, or have unintended 
negative consequences. To this he replied:  
“I think if you make an argument that you are already sharing data and 
pretending you are not, then currently you just have all the downside of 
information and data sharing. So, perhaps if we went to the other extreme 
[and adopted OSRD], to some extent you should only have upside. Whatever 
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negative impact information sharing can have should be out there already.” 
Academician  
This academic representative made the argument that to a large degree 
transparency is already in place, that more transparency and collaboration is 
inevitable, but that “confidentiality is getting in the way all over the place”. The 
implication is that unintended transparency, as opposed to planned and organized 
information sharing, is less efficient. Supposing that widespread information sharing 
is inevitable, then the question no longer should be, ‘Is OSRD good or bad for the 
pharma industry?’ Perhaps the question should be, ‘What is the most efficient and 
practical way to share information?’  
Key informants from all three stakeholder groups responded that the concept 
that information is in actuality being kept proprietary is “a farce”, supporting the 
concept that OSRD to some extent already exists, but simply not in an organized 
and most efficient way. Moreover, if more transparency is inevitable, then any 
psychological entrenchment against OSRD increasingly becomes less relevant.   
Overcoming Barriers: Benefits of OSRD Unproven 
Two key informants, one each from academia and industry, discussed the 
more traditional model of transparency and collaboration in pharma R&D, where 
typically two companies sign an agreement to jointly develop and/or market a 
treatment. This traditional joint development approach is not broad, where 
information is shared among all stakeholders, but nevertheless demonstrates the 
 69 
 
pharma industry’s historic openness to collaboration and data sharing, at least under 
certain, restricted circumstances. 
However, seven of the key informants, representing all three stakeholder 
groups, referenced examples of OSRD-like initiatives, namely voluntary efforts that 
require broad transparency and collaboration among pharma companies and other 
stakeholders for the benefit of general R&D efforts. Their examples included those 
referenced in the Literature Review (Chapter 2) such as the DNDi and 
TransCelerate, but also several more. Table 12 provides a brief description of the 
initiatives highlighted by the key informants.  
Table 13 subsequently examines these eight initiatives to identify which of the 
OSRD components described in Table 5 are applicable. This assessment of the 
OSRD-like qualities of the initiatives are the interpretation of the author, deduced 
from what is often limited information about the structure and activities of these 
initiatives. Note also that when companies collaborate to share data, this in all 
likelihood does not mean that data are shared without restrictions. For example, with 
the Cystic Fibrosis Foundation (CFF) efforts, only placebo data from clinical trials are 
shared.  
DNDi represents the initiative that most closely resembles the OSRD process 
proposed by this research, however it only applies to NTD. Transcelerate is 
noteworthy in that, while it does not share study designs and data, it is not restricted 
to NTD or Orphan diseases and is therefore intended to make all drug development 
more efficient. 
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Table 12: OSRD-like initiatives already occurring in pharma R&D  
Initiative Description 
CEO LSC55 CEO Life Sciences Consortium. Founded in 2005, a task force 
of the CEO Roundtable on Cancer. As part of Project Data 
Sphere, coordinates data sharing by developers of cancer 
biomarkers and therapies.48 
CFF56 Cystic Fibrosis Foundation assists multiple pharma 
companies developing treatments for CF. Placebo data are 
pooled across datasets from multiple companies to provide 
baseline and natural history information on CF. If a company 
is willing to provide their placebo data, then they can see 
everyone’s placebo data.   
DNDi57 Drugs for Neglected Diseases Initiative. Founded in 2003, 
Pharma and foundation funded. Described in the Literature 
Review. 
HIV Drug 
Development 
Not a separate entity or initiative per se. Several key 
informants referenced the voluntary collaboration exhibited by 
pharma companies in jointly developing combination 
therapies, or HIV treatment “cocktails”, which are in wide use 
for HIV anti-retroviral therapy.  
iSAEC58 International Serious Adverse Event Consortium. Founded in 
2007, comprised of members from pharma, foundations, and 
regulators. “The mission of the iSAEC is to identify DNA-
variants useful in predicting the risk of drug-related serious 
adverse events.” 
OMOP59 Observational Medical Outcomes Partnership. Founded in 
2007, a public-private collaboration that includes PhRMA, 
FDA, and NIH to identify “the most reliable methods for 
analyzing huge volumes of data drawn from heterogeneous 
sources”. 
SNP Consortium60 International HapMap Project. A public-private effort “to 
develop a public resource that will help researchers find 
genes associated with human disease and response to 
pharmaceuticals.”  
TransCelerate61 Described in the Literature Review. Industry funded initiative 
founded in 2012 to collaboratively “develop shared industry 
research and development solutions to simplify and 
accelerate the delivery of innovative products to patients”. 
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Table 13: How ongoing OSRD-like initiatives compare with proposed OSRD model   
a
 
P
a
r
t
i
 
d
 
d
e
v
e
a
 Only data for developing bio-markers and therapies 
b
 Only placebo data from clinical trials 
c
 Only serious adverse event data 
d
 Only sharing data on study designs and methods, not actual data and results 
e
 Basic science 
f
  Shares what is deemed “pre-competitive” information such as data on clinical trials investigative sites 
g
 Co-investment describes where pharma companies, foundations, governments, etc. are jointly funding the initiatives  
 
 
Initiative 
Molecular 
structure 
Synthesis 
& 
Manufact-
uring 
Discovery 
Pre-clinical 
/Animal 
Clinical 
Regulatory 
Information 
Cost data 
Co-
investment
g
 
CEO LSCa    x x   x 
CFFb     x    
DNDi x x x x x x  x 
HIV Drug 
Development 
   x x x  x 
iSAECc     x   x 
OMOPd     x   x 
SNP 
Consortiume 
n/a n/a x n/a n/a n/a n/a x 
TransCeleratef     x   x 
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While these efforts are not officially labeled OSRD, they nevertheless are 
aligned with the foundation of any OSRD paradigm, mainly broad transparency and 
collaboration. Thus, for this research, these examples are classified as “OSRD-like” 
initiatives or efforts.  
The OSRD-like initiatives in Tables 12 and 13 have been in place, in some 
cases, for more than ten years, have wide support in the industry, and depending on 
the initiative and length of time since each have been established, have a history of 
success. Therefore, several of the key informants commented that a foundation is 
already in place to allay concerns that OSRD is radical and unproven, as reflected in 
this quote: 
There are a lot of little pockets of good things that have happened that people 
[in the pharma industry] have either, a) been unaware of, or b) not been 
willing or open to think about. I think now is a time when there is much more 
openness to the concept.”  CEO, Small Pharma      
Summary of Results 
Several key informants in all three stakeholder groups acknowledged that 
transparency and collaboration are advantageous from a scientific, patients’ rights, 
and population health perspective. There was no dissenting view on these three 
points, even from those key informants most critical of OSRD. Furthermore, the 
majority of participants supported the concept that OSRD could improve efficiency 
by reducing the time and costs required to amass the data required to gain 
regulatory approval and payer reimbursement. 
A key purpose of this research was to explore whether there also may be a 
business case for OSRD. Twelve of 14 key informants (86%) expressed a view that 
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OSRD would be more efficient, but would improving efficiency offset any loss of 
competitive advantages by sharing trade secrets? In the words of one key informant: 
“So I think in process innovation, [OSRD] can be very valuable… clearly can 
be very profitable at a very early stage... I think it could be significant… I think 
there is a lot that could be done to speed up the process and also to make it 
more targeted… if you could decrease cost by 20%, that is a couple hundred 
million dollars [per each approved drug].”  Academician 
   
It is remarkable to note that most key informants, including the industry 
executives, expressed a belief that OSRD would improve efficiency and thereby 
decrease R&D costs. Therefore, even if sharing proprietary information and know-
how could have a negative impact financially, any negative impact could be more 
than offset by a positive impact on efficiency. This support for OSRD in terms of 
potential financial benefit is a critical finding, as businesses understandably would 
resist vigorously any efforts that are perceived to have a negative impact on profits. 
The following quote sums up the findings that transparency and collaboration overall 
could be financially beneficial to business: 
“Profitability to me should be and I think increasingly is, directly proportional to 
the real innovation and the added benefit we bring to a patient. And I would 
argue that the biggest challenge I see in our industry is getting to the market 
as quickly as is feasible based on the soundness of your data. If you share 
more information, your data ultimately will be stronger.”  CEO, Large Pharma 
  
 
  
 
Chapter 6. Plan for Change 
Given the strong although not universal consensus among the key informants 
that OSRD could be beneficial overall, even to the business interests of the pharma 
industry, then what must happen to encourage the global drug development 
enterprise to explore and potentially adopt OSRD concepts? A major component of 
the interview process was to explore perceptions about likely obstacles and garner 
recommendations for the best pathway or pathways to implementing some form of 
OSRD. Therefore, interview data were used to develop a proposed plan for change. 
Any significant change in the current process for R&D likely requires a 
paradigm shift, as described by Thomas Kuhn in The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions.62 Kuhn is concerned with the nature of scientific inquiry and discovery, 
whereas this research is focused on the process of pharmaceutical science, not the 
scientific outcome per se. Nevertheless, significant innovations in the conduct of 
science, OSRD or otherwise, requires a “scientific revolution” in the words of Kuhn, 
and thus his insights are relevant. First and foremost, Kuhn states “any scientific 
group [cannot] practice its trade without some set of received beliefs” (pg. 4). In 
pharma R&D, the assumption that virtually all actions from drug discovery to 
commercialization must remain proprietary to protect and maximize business 
interests is such a “received belief” that has been, until recently, unchallenged. Kuhn 
also proposes that any data that challenge a paradigm will be resisted until they can 
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no longer be dismissed, and only then can a paradigm shift occur to accommodate 
the new data.  
Pharma developers must start with 5,000-10,000 drug candidates to get one 
drug approved, and over 50% of the drugs that go into Phase III clinical testing fail,7 
thus data suggest that current pharma R&D process is ineffective. Current R&D 
processes that are based on avoiding transparency and collaboration average 12-15 
years to gain a drug approval with average costs of $1 billion, and this is credible 
data that pharma R&D as it is practiced is inefficient. These conclusions were widely 
supported by the key informants, where there was broad consensus that the current 
R&D processes are unsustainable. However, are these data compelling enough to 
shift the current R&D paradigm?  In the words of one CEO from small pharma, “I 
think there is openness to it now that five years ago frankly would not have been 
there.” 
If the key informants are correct in suggesting that the pharma industry may 
be open to a paradigm shift to OSRD, then what are the steps required to broaden 
the adoption of OSRD within the pharma R&D? John Kotter outlines an eight-part 
process to “successfully transform businesses”.63 Kotter proposes that for 
transformation to occur in a business or enterprise, all eight steps must happen and 
in the order presented (Table 14). While Kotter did not comment on the eight steps 
being used to transform an entire industry, the steps nevertheless serve as a useful 
framework for this Plan for Change.  
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Table 14: Kotter’s eight steps to promote transformational change 
Step 1 Establish a Sense of Urgency 
Step 2 Form a Powerful Coalition 
Step 3 Create a Vision 
Step 4 Communicate the Vision 
Step 5 Empower Others to Act on the Vision 
Step 6 Plan For and Create Short-term Wins 
Step 7 Consolidate Improvements and Produce Still More Change 
Step 8 Institutionalize New Approaches 
 
Step 1: Establish a Sense of Urgency 
The primary driver for innovation in the conduct of pharma R&D is the time 
and relentlessly increasing costs of bringing drugs to market. At $1 billion for each 
approved drug, and perhaps as much as $10 billion or more at some of the largest 
pharma companies, the present R&D process is unsustainable in the opinion of 
many in drug development. When asked about what could drive substantial 
innovation in the R&D process, one key informant commented “the fear of death,” 
further noting that uncertainties and poor efficiency are driving investors and 
researchers away from pharma R&D. In terms of R&D efficiency, most agreed with 
the key informant who summed up the current situation as “terrible”. 
Whether the current situation is in fact dire enough to create and sustain a 
sense of urgency is unclear, but the rapid increase in grey literature publications on 
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OSRD-like proposals in the last one to two years suggests that desire for meaningful 
innovation may be growing.  
Step 2: Form a Powerful Coalition 
Drug development has many stakeholders as described earlier – academia, 
industry, and regulators – but other key players as well, including patients and 
patient advocacy groups, payers, and politicians. Data therefore were gathered from 
three of these stakeholder groups under the assumption that innovation, OSRD or 
otherwise, is not possible without a broad support. That academic and regulatory 
participants generally embraced the proposed OSRD model is not surprising, and it 
is reasonable to assume that patients would also applaud greater transparency and 
collaboration such as that proposed in OSRD. However, this research also found a 
surprising level of support for OSRD among senior and chief executives in small and 
large pharma and CROs, which suggests that a broad and powerful coalition could 
be formed for innovations such as OSRD. While there are several OSRD initiatives 
for orphan diseases and NTD that are supported by industry, 43,45,49 the high support 
among the industry participants interviewed for a broader application of OSRD is 
remarkable. 
The group to organize and build a coalition should include all the major 
stakeholders, including the groups interviewed for this research, academia, industry, 
and regulators along with payers and patient advocacy groups. With the recent 
creation of TransCelerate to promote transparency and collaboration in R&D for pre-
competitive information, perhaps it could be expanded to include all the stakeholders 
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and also broaden its mission to consider the OSRD paradigm proposed in this 
research. 
Step 3: Create a Vision 
A potential and broad vision for OSRD was proposed to the key informants, 
where the patentable information would remain proprietary (molecular structure and 
CMC), but virtually all other information would be shared with the goal of making the 
entire R&D process more efficient. While this vision was largely supported by the 
key informants, a detailed framework for exactly what is shared with whom and 
when, in what forum or format, is beyond the scope of this research and still needs 
to be explored. However, this is a critical step, as failing to adequately define the 
scope of OSRD, or any open innovation, can undermine any potential benefits.64     
Step 4: Communicate the Vision 
As described in the Literature Review, there has been a sharp increase in 
grey literature on OSRD concepts in the last two years, and these discussions are 
beginning to be reported in the mainstream press, but less so in the peer-reviewed 
literature. In addition, there have been a handful of conferences or workshops on 
“open innovation” in R&D, such as the Amsterdam Conference on open innovation in 
R&D in April 2012, the Sage Bionetworks Congress in May 2012, and the 
Partnership in Drug Delivery conference in October 2012. The increase in grey 
literature and conferences on OSRD-like initiatives suggests an emerging discussion 
in the press and in public discourse, but at this early stage one open innovation 
proponent asked, “Are we spreading the word or preaching to the choir?”65  
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Step 5: Empower Others to Act on the Vision 
Again, at this early stage of OSRD, a codified vision has not emerged, and 
therefore no person or group is empowered to act. However, two foundational blocks 
are in place to foster this step. 
First, this research suggests that pharma industry executives are open to the 
concept of OSRD and therefore these same executives, and their peers, may 
empower their staff to explore and implement OSRD concepts as they emerge. For 
example, pharmaceutical companies such as Eli Lilly, Novartis, and Pfizer recently 
have created “clinical innovation units”, not to innovate science, but to innovate the 
process of conducting clinical research. These and other large pharma companies 
are not only encouraging their staff to explore OSRD, but they are paying them to do 
so. Second, regulators and industry have already signaled their support of openness 
and collaboration in R&D with the announcements of DNDi and TransCelerate, as 
well as the other initiatives highlighted by the key informants in Table 12.    
Step 6: Plan For and Create Short-term Wins 
“So, I think the ideas [about OSRD] are good, but my feeling is that you have 
to have wins; you have to examples – case studies – to show these [OSRD 
concepts] are best practices.” CEO, Small Pharma 
This is perhaps the greatest challenge to innovation in R&D, where the 
definition for “short-term” can mean years if not decades. Given that it takes 12-15 
years on average to get a drug approved, even if OSRD could reduce the time to 
approval, it would be 10 or more years before we could verify the result. Moreover, 
several drugs must gain approval via an OSRD process to generate and verify data 
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on whether OSRD improves efficiency enough to offset any competitive advantages 
lost by sharing trade secrets. The need to approve several drugs via an OSRD 
approach could push the window for obtaining measurable OSRD results out beyond 
20 years. For most people, 20 years does not constitute a short-term win. 
It is also important to highlight here that OSRD is an example of process 
innovation and policy change, not scientific and technology innovation that can be 
comparatively rapid such as the development of the Salk polio vaccine and the 
antibiotic Penicillin.  Research suggest that changes to processes, policies and 
regulations of the magnitude proposed here can take 20-40 years to develop, in 
particular because this will require “multiple-streams” of academia, government, 
industry, patients and patients’ rights groups, and regulators to reach and implement 
consensus.66 Healthcare reform in the United States and the recent Affordable Care 
Act (ACA) may be instructive here. The ACA is the latest major initiative in a 
healthcare reform process that has lurched forwards and sideways over the last 
century. In certain aspects pharmaceutical R&D innovation may be a smaller task 
than reforming all of US healthcare where pharmaceuticals are only a part of overall 
healthcare. In contrast, the task of implementing OSRD may in reality be more 
complex and time-consuming than the ACA as pharmaceutical R&D is a global 
enterprise, requiring input and buy-in from stakeholders around the world. Using an 
OSRD approach to make R&D more efficient would not work if only implemented in 
a single country. While scientific innovations sometimes accelerate understanding at 
blazing speeds, paradigm shifts and policy changes tend to lag. Therefore, at this 
stage the Plan for Change must rely on more long-term strategies and a flexible 
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approach in order account for the changes in data and opinion that inevitably will 
occur over the course of decades.  
Nevertheless, several key informants stated that short-terms wins are needed 
and pointed to three types of examples, already completed or in process: 
1. Basic Science and Drug Discovery: Many key informants gave examples 
of the benefits to pharma R&D of openness and collaboration in the areas 
of basic science, drug discovery, and biomarkers, citing examples such as 
the SNP Consortium and the CEO Life Sciences Consortium. The 
rationale here is that pharma researchers have already benefited from 
transparency and collaboration in basic science and discovery efforts, and 
these successes can be used to encourage clinical researchers to 
consider the concept of OSRD for Phase I-IV clinical trials.     
2. NTD and Orphan Drug Initiatives: As with the DNDi described previously, 
if the industry sees that it is possible to develop drugs for tuberculosis or 
malaria more efficiently via OSRD, then momentum may grow within 
pharma to broaden OSRD concepts to mainstream drug development. In 
order for this to be most effective, then the DNDi must carefully track time 
and costs information so that the data can be compared with the efficiency 
of drug development under the current model. 
3. Finally, while the first two short-term win options are largely driven from 
within the industry, three key informants stressed the importance of 
political or policy change, more driven from outside the industry. Examples 
here included the EMA’s commitment to proactively publish trial data 
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submitted for review and approval,21 the revision to the FDA Act in 2007,67 
and the EXPERT Act approved by the US Congress in 2012.68 These are 
various legislative initiatives from the EMA and FDA intended to give the 
public more access to data and also to allow the FDA to collaborate with 
external experts on rare diseases, e.g. the EXPERT Act.       
Therefore, there are some short-term successes already in place to help build 
momentum, but we must also be realistic that short-term for a paradigm shift of this 
magnitude could require 20 or more years. 
Step 7: Consolidate Improvements and Produce Still More Change 
Building from Step 6, there are several historic initiatives (SNP Consortium, 
iSAEC) that arguably helped foster more recent efforts (DNDi, TransCelerate). 
Within the Kotter framework, the concept of a continuous process of evaluation, or a 
feedback loop back to Step 3 (Create a Vision), is where the original vision should 
be modified as data are gathered and analyzed that offer insights on advantages 
and disadvantages of the proposed OSRD model. 
Future research is needed in order to inform the process of producing “still 
more change”. In particular there are two efforts recommended: 
1) Detailed time and cost data need to be collected by TransCelerate, DNDi, and 
any similar efforts to compare with historic time and cost data that were 
generated under the current pharma R&D processes.  
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2) Mathematical models need to be developed to test different assumptions, 
positive and negative, about the potential impact of OSRD on the time and 
costs of pharma R&D.    
Step 8: Institutionalize New Approaches 
As with Step 7, this step would take place in the future, if and when any 
improvements are in place. However, one recent example of transparency and 
collaboration, TransCelerate, is in itself a new non-profit company, funded by the 
pharma industry, which is designed to discover, implement, and institutionalize 
operational innovations. If successful, TransCelerate may serve as blueprint for 
ways to institutionalize innovations of any kind, OSRD or otherwise.     
Plan for Change: Next Steps 
The discussion of how Kotter’s Eight Steps can be applied to OSRD as 
described above is in most cases theoretical and beyond the scope this dissertation 
to implement. However, there are immediate steps that can be taken to maximize 
the potential value of this research. 
1. In Kotter’s Step 6 (Short-term Wins), it is critical that TransCelerate and 
the DNDi compile and publish time and cost data that can be compared 
with earlier time and cost data in order to quantify any impact of OSRD 
on R&D efficiency. Therefore, an effort is underway with TransCelerate 
and the DNDi to schedule discussions by or before June 2013. The 
discussions are intended to understand if and how these groups are 
collecting time and cost data, and if and how they plan to analyze any 
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data against the current average estimates of $1 billion and 12-15 years 
for successful drug approvals. 
If they have no plans to collect such data, then the goal of any meetings 
will be to generate support for such efforts within their organizations. 
2. As this research suggests, the greatest hurdle to transparency and 
collaboration is the entrenched belief in the industry that while secrecy 
may be sub-optimal for science and patients, it is necessary to maximize 
profitability. Therefore, a critical next step is to explore creating economic 
models on any impact, advantageous or disadvantageous, that OSRD 
may have. Such models could be both micro- and macroeconomic.  
 
On the microeconomic (compound) level, modeling could include 
exploring the potential impact of whether OSRD or any innovation could 
reduce timelines for submission, reduce costs, or both. Another 
component to be explored is whether OSRD would allow researchers to 
kill drug candidates earlier in the process. Recall estimates from key 
informants that over one-half of drug candidates fail in Phase III clinical 
trials. Therefore, even if OSRD would not reduce the cost of drugs that 
gain regulatory approval, a substantial net savings could be realized if the 
success rate were to increase, that is, candidates could be culled out 
based on poor safety and/or efficacy data earlier in the development 
cycle.  
 
Regarding macroeconomic modeling, three issues need to be explored. 
First, it is possible that more transparency would foster more 
85 
 
collaboration when pharma companies are developing drugs for the same 
disease. Therefore, pharma companies could share the risk in terms of 
costs of drug development, but then also share the rewards, or profits, of 
any approved drug. Such a risk-reward model is already prevalent in the 
industry but is almost exclusive to two pharma companies conducting 
joint-development of a single compound. OSRD envisions the possibility 
that multiple pharma companies might collaborate on multiple 
compounds. Therefore, economic modeling should also explore what 
would happen if OSRD were to generate a better success rate, but that 
any profits would also be shared among multiple drug developers.  
 
Second, economic modeling might include estimates on whether patent 
extensions or other incentives could be used to encourage drug 
developers to implement OSRD concepts before hard data on the impact 
of OSRD could be collected. In this second scenario, the industry might 
be induced to take a chance on OSRD but receive, for example, a two 
year patent extension. The approach of encouraging pharma to 
undertake innovative research initiatives by offering patent extensions 
and other financial inducements have been tried with some success with 
pediatric and Orphan drugs. 
 
And third, modeling would need to include estimates of the costs of 
implementing OSRD. Investments, public and/or private would include 
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both the up-front costs of building data-sharing information systems as 
well as the cost to managed and maintain such systems and processes.  
   
For this Plan for Change, note that DiMasi and colleagues are updating 
their seminal research on the time and cost for pharma R&D and plan to 
have it ready for submission in the Summer of 2013 (personal 
communication). Therefore, one proposal is to have a discussion of 
OSRD incorporated into their paper and/or collaborate on a companion 
paper.    
3. Discussions with the executive team of PRA International in regards to 
appointing this researcher as PRA’s representative to TransCelerate, with 
the intent of using these research results to explore OSRD both within 
PRA and the broader TransCelerate consortium.   
4. By 30 October 2013, a Business Plan will be presented to PRA’s 
Executive Management to create a Clinical Innovations Unit and forge 
links to similar units within pharma and CROs, academia, and with 
regulators.    
5. Finally, as OSRD and other open innovations are starting to become 
discussed at conferences and forums, a presentation on these 
dissertation results will be submitted to the Disruptive Innovations 2013 
meeting and/or to the Drug Information Association (DIA) Annual Meeting 
in June 2014.     
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This plan for change describes both the large scale, over-arching efforts 
required to innovate R&D, but also five steps proposed to be implemented before 
the end of 2013 to maximize dissemination, in a variety of venues, of these results. 
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Chapter 7: Discussion and Limitations 
As with all research, this study is subject to limits and potential biases which 
can skew the results. First and foremost, this is an exploratory, qualitative study of 
expert opinions as whether OSRD could improve the quality and efficiency of 
pharma R&D. As discussed in the Methods section, key informant interviews are not 
intended to generate testable hypotheses in the statistical sense. Indeed, the 
purpose here was to seek informed opinions from several stakeholders to provide a 
foundation for future discussions and research. By design, this qualitative research 
cannot quantify the potential impact of OSRD on quality and efficiency. Therefore, 
modeling the economic impact of OSRD must follow in order to inform the debate 
over any financial advantages and disadvantages of OSRD.    
Other limits exists both in the design of the study as well as its execution, 
including: 
1) Design – Interviewer Bias: The majority of this interviewer’s career has been 
spent in industry, particularly CROs, thereby increasing the risk that the 
interviewer would be sympathetic to the current pharma R&D processes and 
therefore skew both the questions and interpretation of responses to benefit 
the status quo (i.e. less transparency and collaboration to protect business 
interests). One of the academic key informants voiced concerns about this 
potential bias, describing CRO employees as “vultures”. However, it is 
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reasonable to suppose that this interviewer would not have posed the 
research topic in the first place if biased against it. The interview questions 
were designed to encourage open responses to avoid biasing feedback either 
in favor of or against OSRD. Finally, verbatim quotes were cited throughout 
the results, with the intent to have the key informants views and context 
speak for themselves and not reflect a priori views of the researcher.    
2) Execution – Interviewee Bias: It is possible that key informants would tend to 
answer in favor of OSRD, as that was the research topic, in order to be 
supportive of the research efforts. This bias may be characterized as people 
trying to be polite by simply saying what they think a researcher wants to 
hear. Moreover, it is possible that senior executives and regulators would not 
want to be publically noted as being against transparency and therefore might 
not speak freely. To minimize the risk of such bias, the list of key informants 
are confidential and their quotes are not attributed other than high-level role 
and stakeholder group. Therefore, key informants would neither gain from 
supporting OSRD nor be penalized for criticizing it, and therefore there would 
be little pressure to avoid candor.    
3) Execution – Participant Sampling Bias: It is always possible that either 
through intent or accident that the participating key informants are not 
representative of the broad drug development community. To reduce this risk, 
the initial list of potential key informants included over 45 names and 
represented three important stakeholder groups: academia, industry, and 
regulators. At least three representatives were interviewed from each group, 
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with a weighting to industry as these key informants were pre-supposed to 
harbor the most critical views of OSRD concepts.  
 
However, to further reduce the risk of sampling bias, this research would have 
benefited from non-US participants, as drug development is a global 
endeavor and effects global health. This option was considered but this was 
determined infeasible for the current effort.  
 
Also, as discovered as part of the research results, payers such as insurance 
companies are becoming a key stakeholder group, and therefore including 
payers as key informants might have been instructive. Moving forward, it will 
be important to include payers in major discussions about pharma R&D 
innovations, OSRD or otherwise. 
 
Finally, interviewing patient advocacy groups might have been instructive, 
and this is by far the most heavily invested stakeholder group not sampled. 
This option also was contemplated but not implemented as it was assumed 
that such groups would embrace transparency and collaboration without 
substantial reservations. However, this research does not validate this 
assumption. 
4) Execution - Quality questions were ineffective: After interviewing the first five 
participants, it became clear that the questions about OSRD and quality were 
not interpreted by the key informants as intended. The goal of the quality 
question was “process quality”, whether OSRD would have a positive, 
negative, or neutral impact on the design of studies and interpretation of 
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results. However, many key informants interpreted the question to mean other 
important issues which this research was not designed to explore, such as 
drug developer “integrity” and “patient safety”. For the remaining nine 
interviews, an attempt was made to rephrase the quality questions specifically 
around study design and analysis, but nevertheless most key informants 
tended to discuss operational efficiencies rather than the quality of study 
designs and processes. 
With each of these potential limitations and biases considered, the study 
results nevertheless support that transparency and collaboration such as that 
envisioned by OSRD would be positive for: 1) science, 2) patients as individuals, 
and 3) population health as a whole. It is not surprising that representatives from 
academia and the FDA embraced the concept of OSRD. However, it is remarkable 
that the industry executives interviewed generally believed that more transparency 
and collaboration would be advantageous, even perhaps financially. Furthermore, 
although serious concerns were raised that OSRD may be impractical to implement 
in the foreseeable future, these same key informants provided numerous examples 
(Tables 12 and 13) where OSRD-like concepts are already in place, albeit not widely 
known, and that the financial benefits of these initiatives are already being noted by 
pharma. This finding is critical, as it suggests that industry is trending toward 
becoming a proponent of OSRD-like efforts, ready and willing to lead as opposed to 
resisting transparency “kicking and screaming” with “a fleet of lawyers throwing 
themselves on the Capitol steps” of Congress, in the words of two key informants. 
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This raises the question whether any savings, from OSRD or any innovation, 
would be passed on to consumers or held by pharma to increase profits. While it is 
impossible to predict what a business or industry might do in the future, there are 
potential forces that might dissuade pharma from simply retaining any savings. First, 
OSRD as proposed by this research includes some sharing of financial information 
around R&D costs and efficiencies. Therefore, if OSRD were successful in reducing 
costs and pharma used that to increase net profits, such actions would be visible to 
the public and likely become another public relations problem for an industry that is 
already widely mistrusted.12 Second, CER and reimbursement reform as discussed 
in the Introduction is likely to put downward pressure on profits, and therefore OSRD 
or other process innovations may be a way for industry to offset profits lost due to 
reimbursement actions by public and private insurers. In other words, pharma may 
be compelled to consider OSRD to mitigate decreased profitability, but not increase 
margins.    
While the proposed OSRD paradigm was largely supported by the key 
informants, a detailed framework for exactly what is shared with whom and when, in 
what forum or format, remains to be explored and codified. And although the work to 
carefully define the specifics of OSRD remains, this research uncovers a nascent 
consensus that more transparency and collaboration is inevitable and potentially 
positive. As proclaimed by Thomas Krohn (not a key informant), the head of Eli 
Lilly’s Open Innovation Unit: 
“It isn’t a question IF change is happening, it is what will pharma do in light of 
it. We are committed to open innovation in clinical research. We look forward 
to enabling and collaborating with others to accelerate clinical research and 
greater meet patient needs.” 69 
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If more transparency and collaboration is inevitable, then is OSRD a possible 
solution to the problem of high costs for pharmacotherapy and the resulting negative 
impact on population health? These study results support that transparency and 
collaboration such as that envisioned by OSRD would be positive for: 1) science, 2) 
patients as individuals, and 3) population health as a whole. This finding perhaps is 
not remarkable. However, OSRD could also be positive for the pharma industry in 
terms of public relations, efficiency and costs. This finding has the potential to have 
a revolutionary impact on the way that drugs are researched, reported, and 
approved, with the possibility of both maintaining pharma profitability while reducing 
the costs of pharmacotherapies to consumers, worldwide. 
94 
 
Appendix 1: Introductory Letter for Potential Key Informants 
 
Note: May be provided to potential key informant by mail or e-mail, or read as a 
telephone script and then provided later by mail or e-mail. 
 
[Date] 
 
Dear [insert name], 
My name is Timothy King, and I am a Doctoral Student and the University of North 
Carolina in Chapel Hill. I am working on dissertation research as part of 
requirements to obtain a Doctorate of Public Health in Health Leadership. [Note: If 
one of the Dissertation Committee members recommended a potential Key 
Informant, then the following sentence would be included – [DissComm Name] 
suggested that I contact you.]    
My dissertation topic is the exploration of potential innovations in pharmaceutical 
research and development (R&D), with a particular focus on recent efforts referred 
to as “Open-Source”, “Open-Science”, or “Crowd Sourcing” R&D. A basic element in 
Open-Science R&D (OSRD) is more transparency between pharmaceutical 
developers and regulators, and perhaps between academia, competing 
pharmaceutical companies and the broader public.  
Generally, OSRD approaches are limited to rare (“orphan”) conditions, or Neglected 
Tropical Diseases, but my research explores whether it could have broader 
applications and benefits in mainstream pharmaceutical R&D. 
If you are interested in learning more about this research and perhaps participating 
in a confidential interview, please review the attached brief description of OSRD. 
Then, if you agree, we can schedule a convenient time for a 45-60 minute interview. 
Please let me know if you have any questions. 
Kind regards, 
 
Timothy King 
Doctoral Student 
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill 
kingtdn@unc.edu 
+1 919.597.9060 
 
 
Biographical Sketch 
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Mr. King has managed and directed clinical device and drug development globally 
since 1990. This includes director and executive-level responsibilities for 
interventional (drug and device) and observational studies. Recent experience 
includes being the Vice President for Clinical Operations at a biotech firm, and 
directing project management staff in the Global Cardiovascular, Diabetes and Late 
Stage Trials group for a large contract research organization (CRO). His CRO group 
was responsible for over 20 Phase I to IV trials for drugs, biologics, devices and 
diagnostics in over 40 countries with a total budget in excess of 300M USD labor. 
Before this he was the Head of Infectious Diseases and General Medicine at a large 
Academic Research Organization (ARO). At the ARO, he led a group of 55 project 
managers, monitors, and assistants and was responsible for resourcing for the 225-
person Clinical Operations group. He holds a Masters degree in epidemiology and is 
now pursuing his Doctorate in Public Health. 
 
Dissertation Committee 
John Paul (Chair), Margaret Dardess, Don Holzworth, Christopher Shea, John 
Vernon, Bryan Weiner 
 
 
96 
 
Appendix 2: Hypothetical Model for Open-Science in 
Pharmaceutical Research and Development 
 
Note: The intention is to provide this brief synopsis to potential Key Informants along 
with the Introduction Letter in Appendix 3. 
Open-Science Research & Development (OSRD) 
Pharmaceutical companies are beginning to explore broader collaborations and 
transparency with each other, particularly in R&D for Neglected Tropical Diseases 
(NTD) and Orphan indications. These efforts are called by some Open-Science 
(OSRD), loosely modeled on “open-source” software development. Please consider 
this 30 January 2012 press release from the Drugs for Neglected Diseases initiative 
(DNDi), where 11 major pharmaceutical companies are co-investing $785 million to 
support R&D efforts: 
 “In the largest coordinated effort to date to combat NTDs, the group 
announced… that they would… share expertise and compounds to accelerate 
research and development of new drugs… Partners also… pledged new 
levels of collaborative effort and tracking of progress.” 
Another example from Wall Street Journal (Rockoff & Winslow, 11 July 2011): 
“Scientists also had to keep their work secret, exploring new medicines 
without insight from outsiders. But companies can't keep a tight leash on their 
researchers if they expect to capitalize on the deepening understanding of 
how diseases happen, contends the chief executive of Sanofi SA, Christopher 
Viehbacher.”  
The premise here from industry is that more transparency and collaboration in R&D 
reduces timelines and costs. Some academic proponents of OSRD for NTDs go 
further than broader collaborations and advocate for sharing drug discovery 
information publically via the internet for anyone to use. Both industry and academia 
assume that there is little or no profit in new drugs for NTDs and therefore any loss 
of competitive advantage is irrelevant.  
However, reducing R&D timelines and costs are very important for all drug 
development, where each new drug requires on average $1 billion or more and 12-
15 years for approval. Therefore, my research explores whether OSRD might have 
broader applications beyond NTD and Orphan drugs. Can OSRD or components of 
it be modified and applied to all drug development to improve efficiency and quality 
but not undermine profitability? 
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Hypothetical OSRD Approach (for discussion purposes) 
To preserve a patent-based, for-profit model, presumably the molecule and methods 
for synthesis and manufacturing would remain proprietary to the company holding 
the patent. Therefore, drug developers would still have a product to sell if approved. 
Also, in blinded clinical trials, study results would not be broadly divulged until after 
un-blinding to avoid introducing bias.  
Beyond that, proprietary information that might be shared during the R&D process 
could include: 
 Laboratory discovery process data 
 Pre-clinical (animal) research data 
 Phase I-IV clinical research data  
 Clinical Development Plans including Study Protocols 
 Targeted Product Profiles   
 Some or all correspondence with regulators 
 Costs related to R&D, manufacturing, marketing and distribution 
 
Under an OSRD approach, key questions include exactly what information might be 
shared, with whom, and when? If you agree to be interviewed, consider the impact 
of more transparency and collaboration on drug development beyond NTD and 
Orphan drugs. 
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Appendix 3: Informed Consent Form (for Verbal Consent) 
 
 Verbal Informed Consent Form for Interviews about Innovations in 
Pharmaceutical Research and Development 
 
DrPH Dissertation Research Project 
Timothy King 
Doctoral Student at the  
University Of North Carolina, Chapel Hill 
Version: 30 May 2012 
You are being asked to take part in a research study examining the opinions and 
attitudes of various people involved in pharmaceutical research and development 
(R&D). This includes one-on-one interviews about potential innovations in 
pharmaceutical R&D, in particular recent proposals for an “Open-Science” approach 
to R&D (OSRD). Your participation in this study is voluntary. You may refuse to 
participate or you may withdraw your consent during the interview and it will stop. 
Details about this study are discussed below. You will be given a copy of this 
consent form. Please ask any questions you have about this study at any time.   
What is the purpose this study? 
The purpose is to learn more about peoples’ opinions and attitudes regarding 
innovations in pharmaceutical R&D, particularly OSRD.  
How long will your part in this study last?  
Your participation will last about one hour.   
How many people will take part in this study? 
About 15-20 people are expected to participate in this study. Participants will be 
invited to join the study from several groups involved in pharmaceutical R&D 
including academia, industry, and regulatory groups.  
What will happen if you take part in the study?   
Prior to the interview, you will be given a brief description of an OSRD model to 
inform your thoughts and answers. There are no right or wrong answers to the 
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questions that will be asked. You may choose to respond or not respond at any point 
during the discussion. The interviews may take place either by telephone, video 
conference or face-to-face, and you can choose which format you prefer. 
Audio Recording 
Only if you agree, the interview will be audio taped so that we can review your 
responses to make sure we understand what you have said. Even if you agree to be 
recorded at the beginning of the interview, you may ask us to stop recording at any 
time.  
What are the possible benefits from being in this study?  
No. You will not receive any direct benefit from this study.  
What are the possible risks or discomforts involved from being in this study?  
We do not anticipate any significant risk or discomfort to you from being in this study. 
One risk is that comments you share and which you would not like to be shared with 
others could be shared by accident. To prevent this from happening, we will keep 
everything you say confidential, we will not store your name with any audio 
recordings or transcripts, and we will not refer to you by name or institution when we 
write up the results of the interviews. All audio files will be kept in locked cabinets or 
secure servers throughout the study and will be destroyed when the study is 
completed. Therefore, we encourage you to be as honest and open as you can, yet 
remain aware of our limits in protecting confidentiality.  
Will you receive anything for being in this study?  
No. You will not be given anything for participating in this study.  
Will it cost you anything to be in this study?   
No. The only costs to you are your time. 
What if I am a UNC employee or student? 
Taking part in this research is not a part of your job or being a student, and refusing 
to take part will not affect your standing in your job or your status as a student.   
What if you have questions about this study?  
You have the right to ask and have answered any questions you may have about 
this research.  If you have questions or concerns, you should contact Timothy King, 
DrPH Student (919-597-9060; kingtdn@unc.edu). He is the leader of this project and 
will be happy to answer your questions.   
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Also, you can contact Timothy’s Dissertation Committee Chair, John Paul, PhD 
(919-966-7373, john_paul@unc.edu) with any questions or concerns you may have. 
What if you have questions about your rights as a research participant?   
All research on human volunteers through UNC has been reviewed and approved by 
a committee that works to protect your rights and welfare. If you have questions or 
concerns about your rights as a research subject you may contact, anonymously if 
you wish, the Institutional Review Board at the University of North Carolina, Chapel 
Hill, at 919.966.3113 or by email to IRB_subjects@unc.edu. 
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Appendix 4: Key Informant Interview Guide 
 
Interview Format 
Key informants will receive a written invitation to the study and a brief description of 
OSRD (Appendices 3 and 4) prior to the interviews. If participants agree to be 
interviewed for the study, I will schedule in advance a convenient time when we can 
talk privately either in-person, via web conference, or by telephone. It is critical that I 
(the interviewer) be neutral, so that the key informant is at ease and can respond to 
questions candidly and without influence.  
I will confirm the key informants’ verbal informed consent to participate at the time of 
the interview, prior to any data collection, including a request to audio record the 
discussion for later transcription. The questions (Appendix 6) move from general to 
specific as follows:     
 Opening: Confirm verbal informed consent for both the interview itself and 
audio recording. 
 Introductory: A broad question to determine whether the key informant 
believes that the current drug discovery and development approach is 
acceptable, or whether there is need for innovation. A follow-up question will 
assess their current awareness of open-science/open-source/crowd sourcing 
in R&D.  
 Key Questions: The questions that directly address the study’s key research 
questions; and  
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 Ending: A request to clarify any information from the interview.  
The interview will conclude with a thank you and request for permission to contact 
her/him in the future if additional questions or need for clarification arises. 
Finally, immediately after the interview or as close to it as feasible, I will review and 
expand upon my notes. I will also make a qualitative appraisal of the interview, 
assessing the following from my perspective as the interviewer:  
 Interview “tone”: Did I feel that the key informant was engaged? Was the tone 
cordial, distracted, antagonistic, etc.? 
 Interview length: Was the time adequate for full discussion of each key 
question? 
 Clarity: Did the key informant seem clear on the proposed OSRD approach 
(regardless of whether s/he seemed to accept or reject the approach)? 
 Direction: Did the key informant generally answer the questions as asked, or 
tend to veer off topic and need to be re-directed? 
 Veracity: Did I have the impression that the key informant spoke candidly? 
Did s/he appear comfortable to be able challenge or disagree with the 
proposed OSRD approach? 
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Appendix 5: Key Informant Semi-structured Interview 
 
Note: This Interview may be conducted face-to-face or by telephone. 
General Demographic and Background Information 
I plan to gather much information on the key informants degree(s), roles, overall 
experience, etc. prior to the interview and simply ask them to confirm it. This will 
allow me to align each key informant with the appropriate stakeholder group 
(industry, regulatory, academia). This information will not be used to identify the 
informant in the dissertation paper. Such information will include: 
a. Major roles in medical R&D (e.g. clinical researcher, “bench” scientist such as 
biochemist or molecular biologist, statistician, etc.) 
b. Years of experience in drug discovery and development, medical diagnostic 
and/or device R&D 
c. In what settings (e.g. academia, pharma, biotech, CRO, regulatory agency, 
insurance company) 
d. Education and training (both degrees and field of study) 
e. Demographics (sex, age, race, etc.) 
Introduction and Verbal Informed Consent 
Note: Confirm that verbal informed consent is given prior to beginning interview 
and/or audio recording. 
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I am Timothy King, a student in the Doctor of Public Health Program at UNC-Chapel 
Hill. The information I collect is for my dissertation research and is confidential. 
Within the dissertation you will not be identified (by name, title, or institution). 
Please let me know if we can begin the interview and whether I may record our 
conversation. [If Yes, then]  Please let me know if you want me stop the recording 
at any point in our interview.     
[If verbal consent granted, then]  
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this interview to discuss innovations in 
pharmaceutical research and development (R&D), in particular the concept of open-
science drug research and development (OSRD).  
Interview Questions 
1. Main Question: What are your thoughts on the current process for drug R&D in 
terms of quality and efficiency? 
Potential Follow-up Questions: 
 Please describe your understanding or impressions on Open Science R&D 
approaches for orphan diseases and/or NTDs. 
 How do you define quality? Efficiency? 
 Prompt KIs to respond in terms of the various categories of issues -- e.g. 
scientific, regulatory, legal, policy, financial, operational, business development 
such as in- or out-licensing, etc. 
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Now, in considering the hypothetical OSRD approach… (note: refer the key 
informant to the brief OSRD description in Appendix 4 for the remaining questions as 
needed) 
2. Main Question: Would OSRD, implemented more widely than just for orphan 
conditions/neglected tropical diseases, have a positive, negative, or neutral 
impact on the quality of clinical research design, conduct, analysis, and results 
overall?  
Potential Follow-up Questions:  
 How do you define quality?  
 Please elaborate on any impact on research design/conduct/analysis/ results. 
 Prompt KIs to respond in terms of the various categories of issues -- e.g. 
scientific, regulatory, legal, policy, financial, operational, business development 
such as in- or out-licensing, etc. 
3. Main Question: Would OSRD, implemented more widely than just for orphan 
conditions/neglected tropical diseases, have a positive, negative, or neutral 
impact on the efficiency (time and/or costs) of clinical R&D overall? 
Potential Follow-up Questions: 
 How do you define efficiency? 
 Please elaborate on any impact on research conduct (operations). 
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 Prompt KIs to respond in terms of the various categories of issues -- e.g. 
scientific, regulatory, legal, policy, financial, operational, business development 
such as in- or out-licensing, etc. 
4. Main Question: What might a broadly adopted OSRD approach look like?   
Potential Follow-up Questions: 
 Are there components of the proposed OSRD approach with which you 
disagree? [Note Appendix 4 for types of information that might be shared] 
 If so, should they be deleted or modified? Please elaborate. Prompt in terms of 
discovery, pre-clinical and/or clinical information. 
 Are there components that should be added, that is, more kinds of information 
shared? 
 What about the timing of sharing information, such as on-going (“real time”), or 
waiting until certain conditions are met? If so, what conditions. 
5. Main Question: What would be barriers to a broader implementation of an 
OSRD approach to more mainstream pharmaceutical R&D?  
Potential Follow-up Questions:  
 Prompt KIs to respond in terms of the various categories of issues -- e.g. 
scientific, regulatory, legal, policy, financial, operational, business development 
such as in- or out-licensing, etc.  
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6. Main Question: Discussions about OSRD are essentially about innovating and 
improving clinical research. Are there other and potentially better innovations that 
should be considered?  
 Potential Follow-up Questions: 
 Prompt KIs to respond in terms of the various categories of issues -- e.g. 
scientific, regulatory, legal, policy, financial, operational, business development 
such as in- or out-licensing, etc. 
Note to Interviewer: Briefly ask the interviewee if there are any additions, deletions, 
or clarifying comments they wish to make. Time permitting, confirm your notes on 
each question to ensure you have correctly understood the interviewees comments. 
Interview Conclusion 
Thank you for your time today to discuss Open-Science R&D. This has been very 
helpful to me and my doctoral research. If you have any additional thoughts or 
questions, please contact me. Also, may I contact you in the future if I have follow-up 
questions? [Note YES or NO]. Finally, if you are interested, I would be happy to 
share the results of my research when the final report has been approved and 
accepted by UNC (expected 2013). [Note YES or NO].
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Appendix 6: IRB Review 
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Appendix 7. Coding Manual for Interview Transcripts 
 
26 December 2012 
References 
Miles MB, Huberman AM. Qualitative data analysis: An expanded sourcebook. 2nd 
Edition. Sage Press (1994) 
Saldaña J. The coding manual for qualitative researchers. Sage Press (2009) 
General Notes 
 Participant code = first letter of last name plus order that interviewed 
confirmed (e.g. If Jane Doe was the third person to confirm a date/time for an 
interview, then her participant code is D3) 
 Interviewer’s questions/comments not coded. 
 Basic demographic information – not coded, but summarized in tabular form. 
Equivalent to “Attribute” coding in Saldaña  
 Magnitude Coding – most questions were semi-structured and intended to 
solicit broad or “open” responses, not one-word or “closed” responses. 
Questions #2 and #3 asked respondents to state whether they thought 
something was “positive, negative, or neutral” overall, and then describe why. 
 Structural/Descriptive/Provisional Coding. The main structure of codes, and 
then ultimately the “themes” were to a large degree pre-identified during the 
study design stage and embedded in the questions asked. However, 
additional codes and themes were required to handle unanticipated data in 
interview responses. 
o A priori structural codes included Study Operational “Quality”, 
“Efficiency” in terms of “Time” and also “Costs, “OSRD” approaches, 
“Transparency”, “Barriers” to OSRD and/or “Other Innovations” 
o Also prompted participants to respond to questions within certain 
“buckets”, specifically scientific, regulatory, legal, policy, financial, 
operational, business development 
o In vivo (“verbatim”) codes were identified and used when possible, 
although most participants tended to use the key terms as they were 
stated in the interview questions. 
 Process Coding: These were all one-to-one semi-structured interviews, not in 
an otherwise interactive environment. Therefore, the only process codes 
came from the brief assessment the interviewer conducted after each 
interview. In that post-interview assessment, I commented on the “tone”, 
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“length”, “clarity”, “direction” and “veracity” of the interview. These were not 
coded, and no other coding of process was conducted. 
 Affective/Emotion Coding: Most interviews were professional, formal or 
scholarly in tone, with little emotion shown. However, wherever emotion or 
emphasis was exhibited, I noted in the transcriptions by underlining the 
transcribed text.  
 Versus Coding: Many participants were willing to play “devil’s advocate”, 
where they would comment at length on concepts or issues with which they 
previously disagreed, either wittedly or un-wittedly. I noted this in the 
transcript coding with the term “versus”.   
 Administrative: I used red text to note areas of the transcripts where I wanted 
to re-check the recording to verify the transcript, and yellow highlighter to note 
quotes I would like to explore further to include verbatim in the results and 
discussion. 
 
Code Type Notes 
Quality Descriptive In terms of study operational “quality”, also data 
quality, although some interviewers grouped 
“patient safety” issues into discussions on quality 
Efficiency/Time Descriptive Positive/Negative/Neutral impact on time it takes 
to move drug candidates through R&D process, 
and related discussions 
Efficiency/Costs Descriptive Positive/Negative/Neutral impact on financial cost 
it takes to move drug candidates through R&D 
process, and related discussions 
OSRD 
approaches 
Descriptive Discussions about what information should/should 
not be shared in OSRD approach, and when  
Transparency Descriptive References the “transparent” sharing of 
information, data, and/or regulatory feedback, etc. 
Barriers Descriptive Barriers to adopting innovations, OSRD in 
particular 
Timing Descriptive Comments on the best timing of sharing 
information (e.g., after drug approval, “real” time, 
etc.) 
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Code Type Notes 
Innovations Descriptive When participants reference innovations other 
than OSRD 
Scientific Descriptive  
Regulatory Descriptive  
Legal Descriptive  
Policy Descriptive  
Financial Descriptive  
Operational Descriptive  
Business 
Development 
Descriptive  
Decision 
making 
Descriptive Discussion about how decisions get made, and 
whether transparency/collaboration can improve 
decision making 
Ethical 
concerns 
In vivo  
Evidenced-
based medicine 
(EBM) 
In vivo Really an innovation, but one that decreases 
efficiencies? 
Market Access   
OSRD-like 
examples 
In vivo Participants who gave examples where OSRD 
has already happened, is happening. E.g. Gordon 
conferences, HIV collaborative effort, SNiP 
consortium, DNDi, TransCelerate 
Patient safety In vivo  
Payers In vivo Discussions of reimbursement, be it by private 
insurers, Medicare/Medicaid, individuals, etc.  
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Appendix 8: Results. Additional Key Informant Comments on the 
Efficiency of Current Pharma R&D Process, in Terms of Time and 
Costs 
Quotes: Efficiency of Current Pharma R&D Process Participant Role 
The [R&D] process works fine relative to if the ability to protect 
trade secrets but on the other hand, I think the industry 
recognizes the process is very costly and requires not only 
enormous investment in financial resources but also in time.  
But it certainly has been designed around the premise of 
importance to protect trade secrets. 
CEO, CRO 
Well, it’s very slow, I think…There is probably not enough 
communications between the commercial side by which I 
mean expressions of demand for a product and scientific 
discovery. So, you end up with some drugs or forms of drugs 
developed that never really come to market or meet a demand. 
Costs are ungodly. 
VP, Large Pharma 
Now, efficiency - completely different grade completely 
different answer. There obviously different models that 
companies, and I guess you have to look at this from the 
standpoint of a commercial enterprise because that’s how 
most drugs make it into use, but there are obviously many 
models that companies employ to get drugs from discovery 
through registration and some clearly work better than others. 
The marketplace tends to wash out those that don’t do it as 
efficiently as they should, but even with that caveat I think 
overall, the drug development process is an inefficient one. 
And I would grade it somewhere in the 50 – 60% range. 
CMO, CRO 
The current process is cumbersome, hard to navigate at the 
FDA… 
CEO, Small 
Pharma 
Clearly, there’s been this concern in the industry around 
patent-cliffs… Companies have not been able to replace their 
blockbusters with new products so one of the things they’ve 
done is merge, big horizontal mergers, as well as purchase 
smaller companies that are discovery oriented. For the most 
part the big horizontal mergers have not helped at all 
efficiency. In fact, I feel they could be a drag because there’s a 
big transition process, etc. I think there’s more rationale for 
some of the alliances that turn into mergers or acquisitions. 
Those might be helpful towards the process. So that’s the big 
picture.  
Academician 
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Basically coming down to the question of “well what about the 
development process?” The clinical side of it keeps getting 
longer. Well, not so much longer, but costlier and poorer 
success rates. So, that’s a big concern. 
Well, it’s failing. It’s failing because we’re not getting very 
many new molecular ideas. We’re getting a lot of “me too” 
drugs. The cost of bringing drugs to market is continuing to 
escalate, and so what we have is the traditional model for drug 
development is increasingly ineffective. 
Academician  
I think at some level there are problems in both (Drug 
Discovery and Development]. Discovery since the industry has 
moved to this in-licensing model, the issue there is kind of this 
valley of death between academia and biotech and Pharma 
where there’s not a lot of money going into moving things 
forward. So, that’s one series of questions and challenges: are 
there ways in which we can enhance discovery, people share 
science readily anyway, getting the proof of concept if 
fundable, it’s going to be an increasing issue. That’s a critical 
issue. What are the milestones and are there really 
commercially viable milestones? So, that’s some of the 
discovery issues.  
A development issue is it’s always way too costly. You brought 
up, it’s too costly and the development side for small market 
molecules, that’s both on the development side and I should 
say on the marketing side. You know, if you can’t reach your 
target audience in an economically viable way. So, I think 
there is some of both in there. Then, the other issue 
underneath all that, the value of the information you are 
getting, where you have global clinical trials, how does that 
help inform decisions in any specific market even for 
approvable reimbursement. 
Academician 
No, it’s definitely not working. I think there are some 
encouraging signs out there so if you look at some of the 
growth indicators like number of new drugs approved 
especially new molecular entities for priority indications after 
the big down turn in the 2000’s that’s starting to pick back up 
and showing signs of further improvement, but it’s still very 
costly and over time it’s gotten much more costly and more 
time consuming to bring more drugs to market and while it has 
been major revision over the past decade in how Pharma 
companies and biotech companies are doing in investment 
and R&D with an emphasis on genomics and more target 
FDA, Senior 
Official 
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Quotes: Efficiency of Current Pharma R&D Process Participant Role 
therapies and not just filling in, it’s still hardly what anyone 
would view as optimally productive and I think that’s reflected 
in some real challenges and venture capital investments and 
other private investments in R&D in the area going down. 
No, I mean, it’s terrible because it’s so costly and they have 
such poor success rates – the predictability of their models are 
so bad that the enterprise has been endowed until recently. 
FDA, Senior 
Official 
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Appendix 9: Results. Additional Key Informant Comments on the 
Effect of OSRD on the Quality of R&D 
Quotes: Effects of OSRD on the Quality of R&D Participant Role 
I think there’s a lot that could be done on the process side 
and there are lots of initiatives moving right now at different 
places. TransCelerate which we talked about as the latest 
of these, but in the process innovation area you had down, 
in the last ten years as in the Critical Path Institute it has the 
FDA as kind of a grandfather organization that works with 
them and it’s focused on predicting safety tests 
Academician 
[If when you say] quality, you mean more information that 
would lead to better decision making or better outcome, the 
answer would be yes. I don’t know if it would improve the 
quality of the study from the perspective of data quality, but 
certainly more info is always better than less. 
CEO, CRO 
Positive, definitely positive… Because if it’s open, it’s 
disclosed to virtually everybody to look at. You have an 
automatic check on what you are doing. And you probably 
are much more careful… with your own quality controls if 
it’s open. 
VP, Pharma 
So this whole idea then if I understand this if we were to 
create a pathway or venue for doing open science, open 
pharmaceutical science… would that produce a higher 
quality? I don’t know. The answer is no because I believe 
that the quality has to be built into the system from the 
integrity point of view. Would it impact integrity? I don’t think 
so because the regulations are really highly defined and the 
punishment for an IND sponsor would be immense if the 
integrity issues were in some way violated. So I don’t think 
it would make an effect on so-called quality at least as I 
define it. 
VP, Pharma 
I think that the impact on quality would be neutral, in terms 
of research design, conduct, analysis, and results… those 
terms seem more related to efficiency than quality. 
President, CRO 
I guess my knee-jerk reaction to that is that it would depend 
on which transparency was being exercised and the 
dimension on which it’s being exercised. To a degree, I 
think you can point to the scientific literature as the 
traditional vehicle for dissemination of information. 
Advances in science as conveyed through the scientific 
CMO, CRO 
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literature, and by that I mean the publications and 
presentations tend to drive innovation across the enterprise. 
Now what you’re talking about is transparency beyond that. 
The question that I guess you’re asking is would there be 
incremental additive value in quality, and I’m sure ultimately 
efficiency would be the next logical question because of 
that and I think you’d have to hypothesize that there would 
be incremental value. At what point do the owners of 
proprietary information share the data and presumably it’s 
shared at some point, when it becomes not a commercial 
advantage to hold on to it any longer and it’s to the 
advantage of the individual in the corporation to further their 
own careers through publication and so on. It becomes 
more widely disseminated and so what you’re basically 
talking about is sort of moving the timeline for quality 
improvement or enhancing efficiency in one direction or 
another by becoming more transparent sooner rather than 
later. So, I think based on the current paradigm, you’d have 
to conclude that more transparency earlier would result in 
improved quality and improved efficiency, but how do you 
quantify that, can you quantify that? I don’t know. 
It would potentially be a positive, but there are many 
challenges to a broader implementation. My feeling is that it 
has to be proven several times in the orphan arena to 
establish best practices and allow it to migrate more 
naturally to the larger indications like diabetes (which has 
been fraught with many problems). 
CEO, Small 
Pharma 
Part of the reason drugs fail in phase III is simply that phase 
II is inadequate. Wrong dose, wrong study endpoints, and 
inadequately powered trial. That’s done all the time and it’s 
not quite clear to me how this transparency would actually 
help that. 
CEO, Small 
Pharma 
Well I don’t see how it could possibly be adverse. How 
much help it would be is hard for me to say, but you’ll 
always learn from adverse experiences. I think everyone 
does. I can’t help but think it would be useful for people to 
see other people’s experiences; especially adverse 
experiences. So, I think it would be useful, how 
revolutionary it would be, that’s harder to say. 
Regulatory 
So, for everyone who’s working in a particular clinical area, 
it’s in their interest to validate whether there are good early 
markers of both clinical benefit but you don’t have to do 
Regulatory 
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quite so long of a trial to get the outcome and safety risk of 
products in particular patients and the reason that has to be 
open science is that only one company is going to have a 
limited amount of data that could be used to do those 
validation studies in order to predict a marker is really a 
valid indicator and because just from one company there’s 
going to be FDA concern that this is not replicable or the 
company has a specific vested interest in showing that it 
was their compound that they intend to use the marker for 
is safe and effective. Whereas if it was a pooled effort, it’s 
much more convincing that what you’re finding is true, 
scientifically valid conclusion. And then similarly having a 
sort of shared mechanism for developing further evidence 
on the safety and maybe effectiveness of treatment. So, 
definitely safety in the post market setting, which could be 
shared, shared infrastructure. We’re working on a project 
that does this called the Sentinel Initiative with the FDA, 
which involves support from companies who are working 
with a range health, and electronic record systems with 
shared data on safety surveillance, which again applies to a 
specific product of each company. Ones that they would 
normally be studying in their own phase IV study which 
would involve some proprietary investment and is instead 
being done through a shared, common infrastructure which 
is lower cost, easier to use, easier to get large numbers on, 
easier to reach definitive conclusions about. Those are 
several areas where I think there’s real potential. 
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Effect of OSRD on the Efficiency of R&D 
Quote: Effects of OSRD on the Efficiency of R&D Participant Role 
So I think in process innovation, open source can be very 
valuable and consortia of various kinds. Open source clearly 
can be very profitable at a very early stage, very useful, fruitful 
at a very early stage. That is at early discovery stage.  
I think it could be significant, just like, I’m [referencing] the cost 
study, you know the cost of R&D with DiMasi and his group. 
You know if you can cut down a year, it has a significant 
impact. If you can reduce the cost. I think it’s not a very 
efficient process, the way big Pharma goes about it. They have 
huge regulatory groups and they work with others, CROs, etc. 
They’re very risk averse, they do more, they often do it in an 
inefficient way. Maybe some of this is for marketing, but it 
seems like the size of clinical trials are just getting bigger and 
the end success rate is getting lower. So I think there’s a lot 
that could be done to speed up the process and also to make it 
more targeted so I think you wouldn’t [need to] decrease cost 
by 50%, but if you could decrease cost by 20%, that’s a couple 
hundred million dollars. 
Academician 
I can’t imagine that it would because in fact what now happens 
is every new case of drugs that comes along there are 
congeners in development that are often a year or two behind 
the original drug. So, the amount of time that a company has 
exclusivity on a class is relatively short. Take the DPP-4 
inhibitors for diabetes. Sitagliptin was out for a year or two and 
then along came Saxagliptin and now there are 3 or 4 others 
emerging as well. So that saving trivial amount of money a 
couple hundred million dollars saved is nothing. Literally 
nothing in a multi-billion dollar market industry like this. So, I 
can’t see how it would ever be in an industry’s interest to 
share. 
Academician 
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…solving the challenges of designing the protocols and 
collecting the data and that kind of stuff? I know people have 
treated it as proprietary in the past, but to some extent that’s a 
farce. So, maybe being explicit about that. And on top of that, 
this idea of confidentiality is getting in the way all over the 
place. I know it’s not enforceable, people have these 
confidentiality agreements that just aren’t enforced, but legally 
you’re a risk in all kinds of ways. 
[Interviewer follow-up question: Do you think [OSRD] would be 
beneficial? Or do you think it’d be neutral or are there sort of 
unintended negative consequences?] 
I think if you make an argument that you’re already sharing 
data and you’re pretending you’re not, and then you just have 
all the downside of information and data sharing. So, maybe if 
we went to the other extreme, to some extent you should only 
have upside, right? Whatever negative impact information 
sharing can have it should be out there already. 
Academician 
 
 
…more information that would lead to better decision making 
or better outcomes, the answer would be yes, …certainly more 
info is always better than less. It would change initial study 
design because the more information available of a particular 
class of drugs that was similar be the case for across the 
industry.  Yeah it would probably change the study design 
presumably with reduced the number of studies or number of 
patients required for the study. It would definitely speed the 
process. 
[Interview follow-up question: If it did speed the process up do 
you think that could have a positive impact on reducing the 
cost of developing drugs?] 
Yes, yes I believe so, yes. 
CEO, CRO 
Well, if the regulators are involved earlier, then any issues are 
going to be apparent earlier and can be dealt with. I would 
think that that would be a positive… Because everybody 
working on the same therapeutic area can learn from each 
other’s mistakes and advances… If what you can come out 
with looking at specifically the [OSRD] orphan drug model and 
how it’s working there is are there some incremental things 
you can get from this that would speed up efficiency rather 
than changing the process wholesale, then you’ve really 
accomplished something. 
VP, Large Pharma 
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To look at this at a 10,000 foot level would it be possible that 
an open science type context would create a vision that 
companies could use collaboratively to help regulators and 
payers to really understand the direction of the evidence based 
medicine process. The answer to that is, yes, I do think it 
would be beneficial if the open science resulted in a 
collaborative enterprise that addressed some of these 
emerging issues. Especially the changes in regulatory science 
towards evidence based medicine and the effects of payer-
reimbursement on the overall development process. 
I think that across the broad spectrum it would have to add 
value because I think the open science concept would 
configure itself in such a way as collaboration occurred to 
create the most efficient cost-effective process that maintains 
the integrity quality of the ultimate deliverable. So, I think in 
that point of view, the open science would have at least the 
capability of having an improvement. 
[Interviewer follow-up question: Do you have any specific 
thoughts of where you would see the potential for 
improvements in an open science model in time and/or costs?] 
They would involve the planning and conduct of large 
epidemiological studies that define the frontier of evidence 
based medicine in some of these new emerging therapeutic 
areas. It would also be applicable in the context of having 
regulatory guidance that was consistent and supportable from 
both sides of the sponsor and the regulators that would have 
the highest level of efficiency and information access. So I 
think those two areas would be very applicable to the open 
science concept. 
VP, Large Pharma 
[The impact of OSRD on efficiency] would be positive, in terms 
of the benefit of learning from each other. 
CEO, CRO 
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Now on the efficiency side, it’s hard to argue that it wouldn’t be 
more efficient. The more information one has to consider in 
making your own decisions about the most efficient/cost 
effective and resource effective pathway to get to the end 
zone, the better… I think it’s almost unarguable that it would 
be more efficient. 
If you’re talking about making products available for others to 
work with to test and evaluate to combine sort of the DNDI 
concept, TB Alliance, etc., then clearly there’s a giant leap in 
efficiency that’s potentially available because otherwise you’d 
have to wait until these products went off patent before you’d 
have any access to them at all. 
I think the other thing to keep in mind is the perspective from 
which you’re looking at this. If the objective of improved 
quality, improved efficiency is quicker, better advancement of 
products to the end user, to the sick patient or the subject in 
need then, I cannot conceive of a reason why this wouldn’t be 
beneficial from the end user point of view. From the standpoint 
of the developer, is this going to improve quality? Maybe. 
Efficiency? Maybe, but at what cost? 
So, I guess it could have one of two effects. Either it could be 
refreshingly revelatory and could encourage people to be 
hyper vigilant about the quality of the work that they do or it 
could have exactly the opposite effect and all of your work 
would essentially grind to a halt because you’d be afraid of 
exposing a vulnerability. 
CMO, CRO 
Efficiency might be slowed initially as something of this 
magnitude is implemented. Getting agreement by divergent 
stakeholders is TOUGH.  Overall, and over time, the efficiency 
should improve.  It will be very important to establish 
meaningful metrics that can be applied to truly determine the 
benefit over time. 
CEO, Small 
Pharma 
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Well, the old thing of data, information and facts… Before you 
have information you have a ton of data that you have to 
interpret somehow and it depends on who the “we” is. If you 
took it to its extreme then every single thing that the 
pharmaceutical company did would be public. And, that would 
be pretty much a disaster because people can’t interpret 
animal safety data for example. And there are multiple, 
hundreds thousands of cases that every single company has 
seen where you get some horrible toxicity in an animal and 
you find out that that particular species produces a metabolite 
that no other species including man produces and you’re only 
going to see that toxicity in that species and that’s in fact what 
happens, but you find that out later on. So, it depends on who 
has access to the data and who is doing the interpreting and 
there is so much “crack-pot” science out there and all you 
need to do is look at everything from rejuvenation to penis 
enlargement. So, there’s a lot of misinformation and a lot of 
misinterpretation of data that are there. So, in that context, 
that’s what I was talking about. There’d be too much data and 
it’d be overload essentially. 
But there’s a premise there I’m not saying I disagree with, but 
I’m not saying it’s true and that is the odds of success in 
pooling the data go up enough to cover the decrease in return 
and I actually don’t think that would happen. So you put five 
companies together, instead of getting one wise entity you 
simply have five entities coming together and still muddling 
through and so I think that’s the issue. I actually don’t think, 
because a lot of these things you can’t foresee, I just don’t 
think it’d work. 
CEO, Small 
Pharma 
It’s illogical to me to say we believe that the [OSRD] model is 
right for orphan or niche diseases, why wouldn’t it also be right 
for bigger diseases? There really isn’t that much in the way of 
true trade secrets. And to share just as we’re seeing with these 
orphan diseases, data that at the end of the day improves the 
outcome in terms of approval times, times to market and 
patient benefit, I find it illogical not to say that the same 
benefits shouldn’t be extended to broader populations. 
CEO, Large 
Pharma 
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I certainly don’t see how [OSRD] could hurt, and I think that at 
least sometimes people would learn something that would 
improve their next shot. So, I can’t help but think that would 
happen. How often? That’s a little harder for me to say. We 
obviously think that all of our advice is very useful and very 
helpful… 
Regulatory 
It’s definitely beneficial. There are currently a number of areas 
where investments by companies are duplicative even if 
they’re each aiming for somewhat different molecules and 
each really pursuing a strategy of not me too, but finding their 
own-targeted niche. Many of these drugs work on the same 
diseases or the same disease mechanism. In cancer, there’s 
more of a movement toward drugs that affect the same 
molecular pathway with some origin modifications that may be 
different tumor areas and maybe different subgroup of tumors, 
but again, they’re all relying on the same basic systems: 
biology and genomics. There are lots of areas where the time 
and cost of drug development is high because it takes a long 
time to figure out a reasonable degree of scientific certainty 
that a drug really does work or really does have safety side 
effects. It’s in everyone’s interests working in those same 
areas to have better ways of identifying problems and benefits 
in particular patients early, but again that’s something that’s 
very hard for individual companies to do on their own.   
So, there are a lot of applications. Like I said, caution on the 
other side that for some aspects that drugs really are just a 
molecule wrapped in intellectual property or knowledge and 
some of that knowledge results in clinical trials and the like. 
Probably will remain understandably proprietary, but that’s not 
to say there are a lot of areas where there is real promise in 
real open science approaches. 
Regulatory 
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If you move on to clinical development it really gets bad. The 
biomarkers, all those things for years they would come in to us 
and they would say, “Well you should accept this biomarker”. 
It’d be one company and as you well know the scientific 
process involves public scrutiny and evaluation by the 
scientific community and generally replication at different 
hands. And these companies all socialize the model of we’ll 
have everything in-house. They would bring us their own 
biomarkers and expect us to buy them. And of course, they 
would be mad at us because they’ve done a lot of work on this 
so the earliest effort with that was what the C-Path Institute did 
on the safety markers and they found that every large 
company had developed different safety biomarkers for animal 
studies and they had all kind of data on their performance 
because they did the study and they never shared any 
information. 
Regulatory 
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